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Abstract
Privileged self-knowledge says, roughly, that we have non-empirical knowledge of 
our own thoughts. Extemalism about mental content says, roughly, that our mental 
states are determined at least in part by our environment It has been alleged that 
jointly assuming extemalism about mental content and privileged self-knowledge are 
true has the consequence that any subject can have non-empirical knowledge of her 
own environment and this is intuitively absurd. The thesis investigates in various 
ways the problem arises and focuses on the following principle:
Knowledge Transmission Principle:
For any subject S and any proposition P and any proposition Q: if S has a certain 
kind of knowledge that P and S knows that P entails Q, then S knows that Q by way 
o f S’s certain kind of knowledge that P and S’s knowledge that P entails Q.
After investigating the ways of denying the principle with a view to upholding the 
compatibility of privileged self-knowledge and extemalism about mental content the 
thesis reaches the following conditional conclusions:
If we allow that the knowledge transmission principle is unrestrictedly true or if we 
allow for the possibility of so called ‘illusions about mental content’, then the 
consequence that a subject can have non-empirical knowledge of her own 
environment is not absurd.
If on the other hand certain other conditions are in place, then the relevant instance 
o f the transmission principle fails, then we can jointly assume extemalism about 
mental content and privileged self-knowledge are true without them having the 
absurd consequence that we have non-empirical knowledge of our environment as a 
result o f this joint assumption.
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Introduction
It is widely held that we have non-empirical knowledge of the contents o f our own 
thoughts (hereafter self-knowledge). We can know what we are thinking without 
examining the world. Extemalism about mental content says roughly that the 
contents o f our own thoughts are determined at least in part by our environment. 
Many philosophers also hold that some form of extemalism about mental content is 
true. It has been claimed that jointly assuming certain sorts of these theses results in 
us having non-empirical knowledge of our environment and such knowledge is 
intuitively intolerable. This alleged counter-intuitive result invites the reaction that 
non-empirical knowledge of our own thoughts is incompatible with extemalism 
about mental content.
In Chapter 1 of this thesis I set out what I take to be the most plausible argument for 
the conclusion that jointly assuming extemalism and self-knowledge results in 
intuitively intolerable knowledge of our environment. I focus in one specific 
principle which underlies the transition from jointly assuming self-knowledge and 
extemalism about mental content to the allegedly absurd conclusion that we can 
have non-empirical knowledge of empirical propositions namely:
Knowledge Transmission Principle:
For any subject S and any proposition P and any proposition Q: if S has a certain 
kind of knowledge that P and S knows that P entails Q, then S knows that Q by way 
of S’s certain kind of knowledge that P and S’s knowledge that P entails Q.
I then isolate a strategy which attempts to deny this principle in order to maintain the 
joint assumption that extemalism about mental content is compatible with non- 
empirical knowledge of our thoughts. I call this strategy transmission failure 
compatibilism. This strategy is to be distinguished from bullet biting compatibilism which 
maintains the joint assumption of extemalism about mental content and self- 
knowledge by arguing that certain non-empirical knowledge of our environment is 
not absurd. I set out this transmission failure compatibilism’s main strategy and 
review each step of this strategy throughout the thesis.
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In Chapter 2 of the thesis I critically evaluate the transmission failure compatibilist’s 
discussion of the knowledge transmission principle in the case of perceptual 
knowledge. I then apply the results of my critical discussion in Chapter 2 to the SK 
paradox. I argue that given certain assumptions the transmission failure 
compatibilists response to the SK paradox fails. However I take this failure to alight 
on various ways in which bullet biting compatibilism can be argued to be plausible. I 
also note that a certain variant of transmission failure compatibilism is correct, 
provided certain epistemic principles are in place.
Thus my overall conclusions are conditional. My conclusions are very roughly: if 
certain conditions obtain, then transmission failure compatibilism fails but this 
renders bullet biting compatibilism a sound position. If certain other conditions 
obtain, then a certain variant of transmission failure compatibilism is correct.
6
Chapter 1
Introduction
One recent discussion in Philosophy concerns the compatibility of privileged first- 
personal self-knowledge of the contents of our own thoughts (hereafter self-knowledge) 
with certain variants o f extemalism about mental content or anti-individualism. Self- 
knowledge says roughly that we can know the contents of our thoughts non- 
empirically and extemalism about mental content says, roughly, that the contents of 
our thoughts depend at least in part on the external environment. Self-knowledge 
and extemalism about mental content have been alleged to be incompatible when 
both notions are jointly assumed. This is because when joindy assumed they are 
alleged to have the consequence that we can know facts about our environment non- 
empirically and such knowledge is intuitively absurd. In this chapter I want to 
expound the sort o f self-knowledge and extemalism about mental content which 
give rise to the charge that the notions are incompatible. I also want to set out my 
view on what the epistemological principles are which allow us to make the charge of 
incompatibility and defend my view against recent objections.
In §1 I set out what I mean by privileged self-knowledge. In §2 I briefly describe the 
variant of extemalism about mental content which I think gives rise to the paradox. 
In §3 I set out the beginnings of a paradox between extemalism and self-knowledge. 
In §41 discuss transmission and closure principles about knowledge and warrant in 
order to aid comprehension of subsequent sections. In §5, again in order to aid 
comprehension for subsequent sections, I discuss I discuss various ways of arguing 
for the conclusion that arguing for the conclusion that transmission principles fail.
In §6 I finish sketching the paradox I introduced in §3 and show that that there are 
at least two different versions of this paradox. I argue in this section that we should 
focus on only one of these versions. Moreover, I isolate the particular response to 
the paradox I favour and focus on investigating this response for the rest of the 
thesis. In §7 I sketch how I shall go about evaluating the response to the paradox I 
have chosen to focus on.
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§1 Privileged self-knowledge
Suppose that you are asked: ‘do you think Newcastle is north o f London? You may 
give one of the following two answers ‘yes, I think Newcasde is north o f London* or 
‘no Newcastle is not north of London’ depending on your knowledge of the 
geography of England. Whatever answer you give, there is an intuition that you have 
not used empirical investigation in order to give any one of these answers. This 
intuition arises as a result o f us being able to, typically, almost immediately give an 
answer to what is usually considered a simple question. We normally would not have 
to undertake empirical investigation in order to answer this question because we are 
able to just report our own thoughts without undertaking such empirical 
investigation. This intuition does not imply that you can have thoughts about 
whether Newcastle is north of London without undertaking empirical investigation; 
indeed empirical investigation of some sort would be a necessary condition o f having 
thoughts of this sort. Rather, what this intuition is saying is that to access one’s 
thought that Newcastle is north of London one does not have to undertake 
empirical investigation.
One might think that a third response (which is not an answer) can be given to the 
question ‘do you think Newcastle is north of London? The response is: ‘I’m not 
sure whether I think Newcastle is north of London.’ However, such a response 
would be very odd. ‘I’m not sure’ would be a legitimate response if our question did 
not ask the subject what he thought but rather asked the subject what is true. For 
example, if we asked the subject ‘is Newcastle north of London?’, then he could say 
that he is not sure. But it would seem strange for.the subject to claim not to know 
what he thinks, unless he is suffering from some psychological disorder.
Suppose that you are asked a more difficult question such as: ‘do you think that 
knowledge of non-analytic conceptual truths is a priori?’ Again, you could answer 
‘yes’, or ‘no’, although unlike the last example you are unlikely to answer the question 
immediately. This is because unless you have been researching the topic of the 
epistemology of non-analytic conceptual truths, you are unlikely to have a belief state 
about the epistemology of non-analytic conceptual truths which you can access.
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Therefore, in the first instance you are likely to answer ‘no* and may spend a 
substantial amount of time thinking about whether knowledge of non-analytic 
conceptual truths is a priori before you consider changing or retaining your answer. 
You may eventually come to answer ‘yes’ because you have certain beliefs about 
non-analytic conceptual truths, views about what it is to know something a priori 
and views about whether the sceptical attacks on all forms of a priori knowledge are 
successful and so on. Then, you may be able to access these simpler beliefs and 
‘think out’ or deduce your answer to this more difficult question. In this case, your 
access to the more simpler beliefs still did not require you to undertake empirical 
investigation. This is because your access to these beliefs just seemed to be ‘right 
there’ or available to you as soon as you turned your attention to them. And since 
these simpler beliefs add up to thought on whether non-analytic conceptual truths 
can be known a priori, you can, in principle, have non-empirical access to this 
complex thought.
The important point here is that for ‘do you think that P?’ type questions you are at 
least able to settle the question without empirical investigation. And when P is a 
sufficiently simple proposition for you, you are able to setde the question both 
without empirical investigation and almost immediately.
O f course one response to the questions ‘do you think Newcastle north o f London?’ 
and ‘do you think that knowledge of non-analytic conceptual truths is a priori?’ is to 
say ‘I don’t know what you mean’. In this case we would say that you do not possess 
the relevant concepts to answer these questions, you lack at least one of the concepts 
o f ‘Newcastle’, ‘London’ or ‘north o f  or you lack at least one of the concepts o f 
‘non-analytic conceptual truth’, ‘knowledge* or ‘aprioricity’.
What do all of the forgoing remarks have to do with self-knowledge? Well, the 
access you had to certain thoughts which did not require empirical investigation and 
which, in some cases, was ‘right there’ when you turned your attention to answering 
certain questions, is also the same sort of access you have to your thoughts when you 
are not prompted by the questioning of a third party. You may ask yourself these 
questions and, typically, you may not even need to ask yourself such questions in 
order to have access to your own thoughts. So if you think that ‘Newcasde is north
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of London* and you turn your attention to this thought, then your access to this 
thought does not require empirical investigation and is ‘right there’.
I f  access to your thought that P does not require empirical investigation for any 
proposition P, then this puts you in a position to know that you believe or think that 
P without empirical investigation. Let me elaborate. Suppose that you think that P 
and P is one of those propositions which is just ‘right there’ when you turn your 
attention to it, then, if my forgoing remarks are correct, you have access to your 
belief that P without having to undertake empirical investigation. If  P was a more 
complex proposition, then access to the thought that P would not be immediate but 
it would still be non-empirical. Now it seems that once you have access to your 
thought that P, then you can come to know it in a way which does not require 
empirical investigation. This is because your recognising that you have the thought 
that P seems to be all that is required in coming to know that you have the thought 
that P. This is why I shall call such knowledge non-empirical knowledge.
Non-empirical knowledge of our thoughts is first personal. By first-personalI mean only 
the agent who has the thought that P can have the non-empirical access to his 
thought that P and thus come to know that he thinks that P in a way which is non- 
empirical. If a third party were attempting to come to know whether S thinks that P, 
then she may look at the agent’s behaviour or ask the agent. The methods employed 
by the third party involve empirical investigation to varying degrees. Thus, this non- 
empirical knowledge of some of one’s thoughts is first-personal and only first- 
personal.
The way of coming to know our thoughts which we have just considered contrasts 
with the following way of coming to know about other bodily states. Suppose you 
are asked ‘are you in pain?, in this case its seems to be that your consciousness or 
attention can alight on various parts o f your body and that allows you to determine 
whether that part of your body is in pain and hence answer the question. Hence they 
way we come to know our own bodily states seems quite different from how we 
come to know the contents of our own thoughts. The paradox I shall set out later in 
this chapter concerns only knowledge of the contents of our own thoughts and, as
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we shall, see does not obviously have any implications for knowledge of our own 
bodily states.
The sort of knowledge this paradox is concerned with is self-knowledge (as defined 
above). For example, my knowledge that I am thinking that water is wet, which, if 
the intuitive discussion here is correct, is non-empirical knowledge.
§2 The relevant instance of extemalism about mental content
Extemalism about mental content is roughly the thesis that the contents of our 
thoughts are determined, at least in part, by our external environment. I want to 
introduce a form of extemalism about mental content (hereafter extemalism) which I 
think is sufficient to generate the incompatibility with self-knowledge. Note that I 
will not argue for this form of extemalism. That is to say, I will not produce an 
argument as to why this form of extemalism should be adopted over the many 
denials o f it which are on offer.
Very roughly the form of extemalism I want to introduce makes claims o f the 
following form:
If I am thinking that P, then E.
where P is the content of some thought and E is a proposition about the empirical 
world.
A specific instance of this sort of extemalism is:
If I am thinking that water is wet, then E.
where E is some proposition about the empirical world and is related to the content 
of my thought that water is wet.
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What sort of proposition is E taken to be? The answer to this question varies 
depending on the form of extemalism one wants to adopt. E  has been taken to be 
‘there are samples of water in my environment’1. E  has sometimes assumed to be ‘I 
(or my speech community) have had such-and-such encounters with water.’2 For 
simplicity I shall use the following version of E  for the rest of this thesis:
Water exists and is a natural kind term or members o f my linguistic community use 
the term Svater’ whether or not water is a natural kind.3
I shall abbreviate this long disjunctive proposition by saying T live in a water-world.*
What does this form of extemalism amount to? This form of extemalism requires 
that my concept of water vary in counterfactual situations. For example, suppose I 
live on earth and the stuff I refer to in thought and in speech as Svater’ is in fact 
H 20  if water is a natural kind or members of my linguistic community use the term 
Svater’ to denote H 20  whether or not water is a natural kind. But suppose instead, 
of living on earth where Vater’ corresponds to H 20 ,1  live on a different world 
twin-earth identical to earth except that on twin earth there is no H 2 0  but a 
chemical XYZ which has all o f the macroscopic properties of water. The relevant 
for of extemalism requires that if I am having thoughts about Svater’, then the stuff I 
am referring to is XYZ if XYZ is a natural kind or members of my linguistic 
community use the term ‘water’ to denote XYZ whether or not water is a natural 
kind. However, this form of extemalism requires more than just my concept o f 
water vary in counterfactual situations. It crucially requires that the existence o f my 
concept o f water depends on either the existence of water if water is a natural kind or 
the existence o f a speech community that uses the term water whether or not water is 
a natural kind. In short it depends on the existence of a water-world.
1 Davies (2000)
2 Wright (2000), (2001)
3 Brown (1995)
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§3 Outline of the paradox
The incompatibility of self-knowledge of the contents of our own thoughts and the 
specific form of extemalism in the last section is typically established as follows. It is 
argued that the any subject S can run through the following argument (W) without 
using any empirical resources:
(W)
(Wl) I am thinking that water is wet.
(W2) If  I am thinking that water is wet, then I’m in a water-world.
Therefore,
(W3) Pm in a water-world.
It is argued that S can know (Wl) non-empirically (as we saw in §1). And S does not 
require empirical knowledge that (W2) in order to derive (W3) from his knowledge 
that (Wl); I shall return to this claim in §6. Hence, S can know (W3) non- 
empirically. But our intuitions are that S does not know non-empirically that (W3) 
since non-empirical knowledge of (W3) is absurd.
Spelled out in more detail the reductio says that the following is possible for any 
subject S:
(1) S knows non-empirically that (Wl). 
and
(2) (W2).
Therefore,
(3) S knows non-empirically that (W3).
But,
(4) It is not the case that S knows non-empirically that (W3).
Therefore,
(5) S knows non-empirically that (W3) and it is not the case that S knows non- 
empirically that (W3).
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For brevity I shall refer to (1) to (5) as the SK paradox.
How does the proponent of the SK paradox derive (3) from (1) and (2)? There are 
broadly two views on how this can be done. In order to explain these views I need 
to introduce so called transmission and closure principles about knowledge and warrant. 
These can be quite tricky notions and so to aid comprehension I shall discuss them 
at length in §4 and §5. I can then return to the question of how (3) is derived from
(1) and (2) in §6.
§4 Transmission and closure
It might be thought compelling that any subject can gain knowledge by thinking 
through a valid argument which has true premises. More specifically, it might be 
thought to be true that if a subject, S, knows the premises o f an argument, recognises 
that the argument is valid, then S can gain knowledge of the argument’s conclusion 
from his recognition of the validity of the argument and his knowledge of the 
argument’s premises. However, consider the following argument from Dretske.4
(Z)
(Zl) That animal is a Zebra.
(Z2) If  that animal is a Zebra, then that animal is not a cleverly disguised mule. 
Therefore,
(Z3) That animal is not a cleverly disguised mule.5
There is a strong intuition that if S knows the premises of (Z), S does not come to 
know the conclusion of (Z) by way of the kind of knowledge he has of the premises 
o f (Z) and his recognition that (Z) is valid. Why is this intuition so strong? Well, S 
typically knows (Zl) on the basis o f his perceptual experiences, usually his visual 
experiences, and this somehow furnishes S with the knowledge that (Zl). A small 
amount of reflection allows S to know (Z2). But does S’s perceptual knowledge that
4 Dretske (1970)
5 I’m taking cleverly disguised here to mean ‘visually cleverly disguised as a zebra’
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(Zl) and S’s reflective knowledge that (Z,2),give S knowledge that (Z3)? If  the animal 
was a mule cleverly disguised as a zebra, wouldn’t S be having just the same visual 
experiences he would have if the animal really was a zebra? Has S checked that the 
animal is not a mule cleverly disguised as a zebra? Has S checked the zookeeper isn’t 
conspiring to hoax his visitors? Typically S will not have checked these things, so S 
does not know them. And even if S had checked these things, then he may know 
(Z3) but he wouldn’t know (Z3) by way of his perceptual knowledge of (Z1) and his reflective 
knowledge of (Z2) and recognising (Z) is valid. Rather, S may know (Z3) in another way 
for example by way of the testimony of a trusted source, induction, memory or some 
other means.
Some other arguments which are alleged to fall foul of the intuition that we can 
know the conclusion of a valid argument by way of knowing the argument’s 
premises and recognising the argument is valid are listed below.
(M)
(Ml) That is a hand.
(M2) If that is a hand then, the external world.
Therefore,
(M3) The external world exists.
(RED)
(RED1) The wall is red.
(RED2) If the wall is red, then it is not the case that the wall is white cleverly lit by 
red.
Therefore,
(RED3) It is not the case that the wall is white cleverly lit by red lighting.
Again there is a strong intuition that if I know (Ml) by way of my typical visual 
experiences of my hand, know (M2) by reflection, I do not thereby know (M3). The 
same observations follow mutatis mutandis for the (RED) argument.
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Arguments like the (Z), (M) and (RED) contrast with the following argument (F):
<R
(FI) The animal in the garbage is a fox.
(F2) If  the animal in the garbage is a fox, then it is not a cat. 
Therefore,
(F3) The animal in the garbage is not a cat.6
In the case of (F) my visual experiences of a fox furnish me with knowledge that 
(FI). I also know (F2) by reflection. And our intuition is that I can come to have a 
warrant for believing (Z3) by way of my visual knowledge that (FI) and my 
knowledge that (Z2).
In normal cases, like (F), we expect our typical perceptual knowledge that the major 
premise is true and our knowledge of the entailment to give us knowledge that the 
conclusion is true. We expect, in other words, the following knowledge transmission 
principle to hold true:
Knowledge Transmission Principle:
For any subject S and any proposition P and any proposition Q: if S has a certain 
kind o f knowledge that P and S knows that P entails Q, then S knows that Q by way 
o f S’s certain kind of knowledge that P and S’s knowledge that P entails Q.7
When the knowledge transmission principle holds true I shall say the S ’s knowledge 
that P transmits across the known entailment. When there is a counterexample to the 
knowledge transmission principle I shall say knowledge that P fails to transmit across 
the known entailment or when the context is clear I shall say there is a knowledge 
transmission failure.
6 Brown (2004), p58
7 Pve restricted the principle to a simple entailment since for my purposes this simple 
formulation is the only formulation I need. For simplicity, I am also waiving 
difficulties from counter-examples which say the principle fails because S does not 
believe the conclusion of every valid argument whose premises S knows.
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Note that the knowledge transmission principle is knowledge specific, that is, certain 
kinds of knowledge that P may fail to transmit across the known entailment while 
other kinds of knowledge do not suffer from a failure. That is, it is possible there 
can be one way of knowing that P that fails to transmit across the known entailment 
and there can be a distinct way of knowing that P which does in fact transmit across 
the known entailment.
For example, our intuition is that our typical perceptual knowledge that (Zl) failed to 
transmit across the known entailment (Z2). But suppose I have a special kind of 
perceptual knowledge that (Zl) which is different from my typical perceptual 
knowledge of a zebra. Suppose that I have knowledge that (Zl) by way of my 
having a visual experience of a zebra together with an auditory experience of the zebra 
making a braying noise which no other animal can make. It seems here that we may 
say this special kind of perceptual knowledge transmits across the known entailment 
(Z2) whereas my typical perceptual knowledge that (Zl) does not transmit across the 
same known entailment.8
How do issues concerning transmission of knowledge relate to issues concerning 
closure principles about knowledge? To see how the issues relate consider the (Z) 
argument again. Our intuition was that I usually know that (Zl) (that animal is a 
zebra) as a result of my typical perceptual experiences of a zebra and that I know 
(Z2) (if that animal is a Zebra, then that animal is not a cleverly disguised mule), by 
reflection. But our intuition was that my typical perceptual knowledge that (Zl) did 
not transmit across the known entailment (Z2). But we also allowed I could know 
that (Z3) in another way, by induction or memory. I could even ask the zookeeper if 
the animal is a cleverly disguised mule and then investigate whether the zookeeper is 
a trustworthy source o f information, and so on in order to gain knowledge that (Z3).
8 This example is in Pryor (ms)' p5 n5
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Consider a typical closure principle.
Knowledge Closure Principle
For any subject S any proposition P and any proposition Q: if S knows that P and S 
knows that P entails Q, then S knows that Q.
All the knowledge closure principle states is an acceptable combination of knowledge 
ascriptions for S, it remains silent about the way in which S has obtained his 
knowledge that Q.
More explicitly the knowledge closure principle says:
For any subject S any proposition P and any proposition Q: if S knows that P and S 
knows that P entails Q, then S knows that Q in any way whatsoever.
Hence our intuition is that arguments such as (Z), (M) and (RED) are counter­
examples to the knowledge transmission principle, when we have typical perceptual 
knowledge that their major premise are true and know their minor premises, but 
such arguments may not be counter-examples to the knowledge closure principle.
On the other hand for arguments such as (F) we would say that since (F) satisfies the 
knowledge transmission principle when we have typical perceptual knowledge that 
(FI), then (F) satisfies the knowledge closure principle when we have typical 
perceptual knowledge that (FI) and knowledge that (F2).
More generally the knowledge closure principle is a necessary condition for the 
knowledge transmission principle and the knowledge transmission principle is a 
sufficient condition for the knowledge closure principle.
The discussion so far has used the term ‘knowledge’ and has asked whether S knows 
the conclusion of a valid argument by way of the kind of knowledge S has for the 
premises of this valid argument. However, recent discussion of this topic is usually 
conducted using the term warrant. It will be easier for me to discuss this area if I
18
follow the convention set by recent literature. In order to do this I need to set out 
what I mean by the term warrant. The use of the term ‘warrant’ may have some 
motivation since some philosophers would deny that we know propositions that (M3) 
the external world exists and perhaps deny that we know many other ordinary 
propositions. However these philosophers may grant that we have a warrant or 
justification for believing ordinary propositions and perhaps even propositions like 
(M3).
When I say S’s warrant for believing a certain proposition is w, I will mean S’s 
justification for believing a certain proposition is that w. I’m being deliberately vague 
about the term warrant for the moment because firstly, the recent literature on 
transmission failure is also vague about the term and secondly, the subsequent 
discussion o f transmission failure should give a more precise picture of what is 
meant by warrant (see §5 for this). I allow that warrants are defeasible in the sense 
that a warrant for P does not entail that P is true.
For example, on some views my visual experiences o f a zebra in a cage is sufficient 
to give me a warrant for the proposition that animal is a zebra and I could label this 
warrant say w,. Similarly, if I’m told by testimony from a trustworthy source that 
there is a zebra in the cage, then on some views, this gives me warrant for the 
proposition there is a zebra in the cage. But this testimonial warrant is a different 
sort of warrant which is afforded by my visual experiences of the zebra in the cage, 
so this warrant other can be labelled anything other than wls lets call it w2. If  on 
some views my auditory experiences alone of the noises made by a zebra are 
sufficient to give me warrant for the proposition there is a zebra in the cage, then we 
might want to call this warrant w3. Similarly, if the combination of both my visual 
and auditory experiences o f a zebra are sufficient to give me warrant for the 
proposition there is a zebra in the cage, then we might want to call this warrant w4. 
Note w4 is distinct from w, and w3.
Furthermore, when I say that someone’s warrant for believing that p is that w, or that I 
will not only mean that the person has a certain justification for believing the
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proposition, but that the person does believe the proposition, and that the person 
believes the proposition in some sense on the basis o f the relevant justification.9
I shall use the term warrant to believe to mean that the person has a certain justification 
for believing the proposition without actually believing the proposition.10
The zebra example can now be framed using the term ‘warrant for believing’. 
Suppose my perceptual experience of a zebra in a cage gives me a warrant for 
believing that the animal in the cage is a zebra. Let’s call this warrant for believing w. 
Again, a little reflection allows me to come to know that (Z2) if the animal in the 
cage is a zebra, then it is not a cleverly disguised mule. The question now is: do I 
acquire a warrant for believing that the animal in the cage is not a cleverly disguised 
mule by way o f my warrant w for believing (Zl) and my knowledge that (Z2)?
Again, the intuition is that I do not. Consider:
Warrant Transmission Principle:
For any subject S and any proposition P and any proposition Q: if S has a warrant, w, 
for believing P and S knows P entails Q, then S has a warrant for believing Q by way 
of his warrant w for believing P and knowledge that P entails Q.
When the warrant transmission principle holds true I shall say S's warrant w transmits 
across the known entailment. When there is a counterexample to the transmission 
principle I shall say S ’s warrant w fails to transmit across the known entailment or when the 
context is clear I shall say there is a transmission failure.
Our intuition is that my typical perceptual warrant, w, for believing (Zl) fails to 
transmit across the known entailment (Z2).
Note that the transmission principle is warrant specific, that is it allows that some 
warrants a subject has for believing P can fail to transmit across the known 
entailment while other warrants for believing P do not suffer from a failure. That is,
91 got this definition from Silins (ms)
101 got this definition from Silins (ms)
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it is possible there can be a warrant for believing, w, that fails to transmit across the 
known entailment and there can be a distinct warrant for believing, w*, which does 
in fact transmit across the known entailment.
For example, our intuition is that our typical visual warrant, w, for believing (Zl) 
failed to transmit across the known entailment (Z2). But, again, suppose I have a 
warrant, w* distinct from w, for believing (Zl). Suppose also that w* consists of my 
having a visual experience of a zebra together with an auditory experience of the 
zebra making a braying noise which no other animal can make. It seems here that 
we may say w* transmits across the known entailment (Z2).
What is the relation between the warrant transmission principle and the knowledge 
transmission principle? This is where things get tricky. Philosophers use warrant 
transmission principles to talk about knowledge transmission principles. But it is not 
usually not very clear about what justifies their doing this. In the section below I 
shall discuss using warrant transmission principles to talk about knowledge 
transmission principles.
§5 Transmission Principles
The some philosophers take the relation between warrant and knowledge to be that 
roughly:
For any subject S: if S has a certain kind of knowledge that P, then S has a certain 
kind of warrant for believing P corresponding to this kind of knowledge.
For example, if S knows non-empirically that he is thinking that P, then S has a non- 
empirical warrant for believing that he is thinking that P.
It is as a result o f the relation between warrant and knowledge above that many 
philosophers take the knowledge transmission principle to entail the warrant 
transmission principle when the S’s kind of knowledge that P is related to S’s kind of 
warrant that P. That is to say they take:
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Knowledge Transmission Principle:
For any subject S and any proposition P and any proposition Q: if S has a kind of 
knowledge that P and S knows that P entails Q, then S knows that Q by way of S’s 
certain kind of knowledge that P and S’s knowledge that P entails Q.
to entail:
Warrant Transmission Principle.
For any subject S and any proposition P and any proposition Q: if S has a warrant, w, 
for believing P and S knows P entails Q, then S has a warrant for believing Q by way 
o f his warrant w for believing P and knowledge that P entails Q.
when the kind of knowledge that P (S has) in the knowledge transmission principle 
entails S has the warrant, w, for believing P.
The philosopher’s who take this entailment to be true, may also argue that a failure 
o f the warrant transmission principle entails a failure o f the knowledge transmission 
principle for the appropriate kind of knowledge related to the warrant w. Consider 
Jessica Brown recommending just such a move:
“In principle, we have a counterexample to the transmission o f knowledge whenever 
any component o f knowledge fails to transmit across a valid argument” (2003, 
p ll8 )n.
What is the problem of arguing this in this way for the transmission of knowledge? 
The problem is that the following argument is invalid:
(1) X is a necessary condition for knowledge that P.
(2) X does not transmit across a known entailment.
Therefore,
(3) Knowledge does not transmit across a known entailment.
11 Davies (2000) tacitly makes this move see p393
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Why is (l)-(3) invalid? It is because it is possible that a certain of knowledge can fail 
to have a property (in this case transmission across the known entailment) which is 
consistent with knowledge itself having this property. It may be that several 
necessary conditions on knowledge interact which leave the result that a certain kind 
of knowledge transmits across a known entailment yet a necessary condition on 
knowledge fails to transmit across an entailment.12
The better way for arguing for failure o f the knowledge transmission principle would 
have been to argue as follows: Assume that for any subject S: S has a certain kind of 
knowledge that P and S knows that (if P, then Q). And then show how S does not 
obtain a warrant, w’, for believing Q by way of this certain kind o f knowledge that P 
and knowledge that (if P, then Q). And since no such warrant w’ can be obtained S 
does not know that Q by way of this certain kind of knowledge that P and 
knowledge that (if P, then Q).
However, as we have seen above many discussions o f the failure of the knowledge 
transmission principle argue that such a principle fails because the corresponding 
warrant transmission principle fails. This is not ideal, many philosophers I discuss 
later will argue for the failure of the knowledge transmission principle in this way. I 
therefore want to tentatively suggest how we can work around this invalid way of 
arguing for the failure of the knowledge transmission principle.
One way to work around this invalid argument would be to treat the term warrant 
for believing in the warrant transmission principle as a knowledge sufficient warrant.
w is a knowledge sufficient warrant for P iff (if P is true and S has warrant w for 
believing P, then S knows that P).
Hence, if P is in fact true and S has warrant w for believing that P, then S knows that 
P. When I use the term warrant for believing P from now on I shall mean a knowledge 
sufficient warrant for P.
12 This point is made against closure principles by Warfield (2004). But, I think, 
Warfield’s point applies to transmission principles too.
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When warrant and knowledge are related in this way it is hard to see that there will 
be cases where warrant fails to transmit across a known entailment and yet 
knowledge does transmits across the same entailment. This is because it is difficult 
to see how the necessary conditions of truth and knowledge sufficient warrant would 
interact to secure a contrary result.
§6 Strategies of deriving non-empirical knowledge from 
extemalism and self-knowledge
We can now return to the SK paradox and examine how (3) can be derived from (1) 
and (2). Recall the paradox was as follows for any subject S who considers the (W) 
argument.
(1) S knows non-empirically that (Wl) I am thinking that water is wet.
(2) (W2) If  I am thinking that water is wet, then I’m in a water-world: (i.e. if 
(Wl), then (W3)).
Therefore,
(3) S knows non-empirically that (W3) I’m in a water-world.
(3) then conjoins with (4) below:
(4) It is not the case S knows non-empirically that (W3) I’m in a water-world.
In order to derive the absurd conclusion (5):
(5) S knows non-empirically that (W3) and it is not the case that S knows non- 
empirically that (W3).
One proposal about how (3) is validly derived from (1) and (2) is proposed by 
McKinsey (2003). McKinsey holds that (1), (2) and the McKinsey closure principle below 
are sufficient to establish (3):
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McKinsey Closure Principle:
Necessarily, for any subject S: tfS  can know non-empirically that (Wl) and in fact (if 
(Wl), then (W3)), then S can know non-empirically that (W3).13
The McKinsey closure principle is a consequence of a more general closure principle 
McKinsey holds true which he labels (CA):
Necessarily, for any person x  and any propositions p and q, if x  can know non- 
empirically that p and [in fact] p logically implies q, then *• can know non-empirically 
that q.14
I shall call this strategy the McKinsey proposal.
A second proposal says that (3) follows from (1) and (2) by assuming (i) that S 
knows that (W2) a priori and (ii) holding that S’s non-empirical knowledge that (Wl) 
transmits across the a priori known entailment (W2). I shall call this the transmission 
proposal. Note that the transmission principle requires the SK paradox to have an 
extra premise, not only must (W2) in fact be true but S has to know (W2) a priori. 
Note also that i f  S’s non-empirical knowledge that (Wl) fails transmit across the a 
priori known entailment (W2), then we cannot derive (3) S knows non-empirically 
that (W3) I’m in a water-world.
The McKinsey proposal threatens the transmission proposal in the following way. 
The McKinsey proposal has the consequence that regardless of whether the 
transmission proposal is true, (3) can be derived from (1) and (2).
McKinsey’s argument that his proposal has this threat is as follows. Consider the 
following entailment:
13 The SK paradox changes slightly when (CA) is used since the relevant ‘can’ 
operators need to be inserted in the other premises. I’m waiving this difficulty here.
14 McKinsey (2003), I’ve changed his use of ‘a priori’ to ‘non-empirical’ but this 
won’t matter for our purposes here.
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(G) Laura is thinking that George is cute logically implies George exists.15
According to McKinsey, if we can know our own thoughts non-empirically, then 
antecedent of (G) can be known non-empirically, by Laura. Hence by (CA) Laura 
can know George exists non-empirically. But Laura knowing George exists non- 
empirically is intuitively absurd, hence Laura cannot know George exists non- 
empirically. Hence only, (G), (CA) and allowing that Laura can have non-empirical 
knowledge of the antecedent of (G) are required to generate a paradox. Also note 
the following:
“ [t]he source o f one’s warrant for believing that George exists could not be that one 
has correctly deduced this conclusion from the relational premise in question, since 
one would not be warranted in believing the relational premise in the first place, 
unless one were already warranted in believing that George exists. Thus, in the very 
cases to which my argument for incompatibilism most clearly applies, warrant does 
not transmit from the cognitive premise to the externalist consequence. But contrary 
to what both Davies and Wright contend, this does not show that there is anything 
wrong with my argument wrong with my argument. For the argument does not 
assume that warrant is always transmitted from the relevant cognitive premises to the 
externalist conclusions.” (2003, p i 02-3).
So, according to McKinsey, Laura’s knowledge that George exists cannot have been 
obtained by deducing it from the entailment (G). This is because, according to 
McKinsey, Laura must already know George exists in order to think that George is 
cute. Hence according to McKinsey the relevant application of transmission of 
knowledge fails in this case: Laura cannot gain (non-empirical) knowledge George 
exists by way of her non-empirical knowledge that she is thinking George is cute 
even if she could have a priori knowledge of (G).
O f course we cannot know George exists non-empirically, so if McKinsey is correct 
and Laura must already know George exist in order to know that she is thinking 
George is cute, then Laura’s knowledge of this thought will be empirical in some 
sense.
15 Note that George is a man who does in fact exist and whom Laura is looking at.
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McKinsey’s position is neatly summarised in the following quote (McKinsey uses a 
priori where I have used non-empirical):
“When my argument for incompatibilism is applied to a particular relational 
cognitive premise like (3), we assume for reductio that (3) is knowable a priori (by 
Laura). This assumption, as it turns out, is contrary to fact. But if (3) were knowable a 
priori, then CA generates the absurd consequence that Laura could know a priori 
that George exists. And surely, that is the correct result. For if (3) were knowable a 
priori, then it would be knowable without empirical investigation. Hence any 
assumption on warrant for which knowledge of (3) is based would itself have to be 
knowable without empirical investigation. For otherwise, knowledge of (3) would, 
contrary to our assumption for reductio, be based in part on empirical investigation 
after all, since it would be based in part on whatever empirical investigation is 
required to provide warrant for the relevant empirical assumption. In this particular 
case, knowledge of (3) clearly depends on the agent’s having warrant for the 
assumption that George exists. Hence one could not have a priori knowledge o f (3), 
unless one also had a priori knowledge that George exists. Here then is a clear case 
in which warrant fails to transmit from a premise to a deductive consequence o f that 
premise, even though my closure principle for apriority CA yields the right result. 
And in general we may conclude that failure of warrant to transmit to a given 
conclusion is not a good reason to suspect that closure of apriority fails in the same 
case. Failure of warrant transmission is perfectly consistent with successful closure of 
apriority.” (2003, ppl02-3)
Now one can see how McKinsey would apply his strategy to the (W) argument. He 
would make the following claims:
(a) S cannot know (Wl) I am thinking that water is wet unless S already knows 
that (W3) I am in a water world.
(b) Hence, from (a), when we assume (1) for reductio we can use (2) and (CA) to 
generate the absurd consequence that S can know that (W3) a priori.
(c) Hence, from (a), we cannot know that (W3) by way of knowledge that (Wl). 
Therefore, the relevant instance of transmission which would result in S 
knowing that (W3) non-empirically by way of non empirical knowledge that 
(Wl) and a priori knowledge that (W2) fails.
I think there are two problems with the above claims. The first problem is with the 
truth o f claim (a). The second problem is with the plausibility o f the McKinsey’s 
closure principle (CA). The first problem is that, so far, in the discussion of self- 
knowledge it has not been obvious that in order to know that we think certain 
thoughts we need to know that the environment is in such-and-such a way (e.g.
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George exists in this environment or the environment is a water-world). Sure, 
extemalism used in the SK paradox holds, roughly, that i f  in fact a subject is thinking 
or thinks certain thoughts, then the environment is such and such a way. For 
example, the relevant instance of extemalism discussed in the SK paradox says i f  in 
fact S thinks that water is wet, then S is in a water world. But neither extemalism nor 
the discussion of self-knowledge here obviously have the consequence that in order 
to know that (Wl), S already has to know that (W3). Therefore, it is reasonable to 
suggest that McKinsey’s claim (a) makes certain controversial demands on 
knowledge of our own thoughts, controversial demands which do not obvious 
follow from our pre-theoretical discussion of self-knowledge earlier and the truth of 
the relevant instance of extemalism. It is therefore sensible to work with an SK 
paradox that treats claim (a) above as false, the transmission strategy allows us to do 
this.
The second problem with the McKinsey strategy is that (CA) on some readings 
invites counter-examples. Suppose we the phrase ‘S can* as £S has the psychological 
propensity to*. On this reading (CA) commits us to saying if S has the psychological 
propensity to know that all of Peano’s axioms are true non-empirically, then S has 
the psychological propensity to know certain complex truths of arithmetic non- 
empirically. But this is surely false certain subjects simply do not have the 
psychological propensity to know the complex truths o f arithmetic. Many other 
examples could be formulated along these lines. By contrast the transmission 
strategy does not use a dubious closure principle in its statement of the self- 
knowledge paradox.16
Suppose instead we treat the phrase ‘S can’ in (CA) as ‘S is at least in a position to’. 
There are, however, again counter-examples to (CA) when ‘can’ is read in this way. 
For example, suppose P logically entail a proposition Q and suppose Q is a truth 
which cannot be known (perhaps Q is a necessary truth which we cannot 
comprehend). Then even if we grant S can know P non-empirically and P logically
16 Another counter-example could be constructed if Q is a truth so horrendous that 
it will kill any subject as soon as she entertains it. Here the antecedent of (CA) is 
satisfied but the consequent will not be since any subject who entertains Q will be 
dead.
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entails Q, S is not in a position to know that Q in any way whatsoever including a 
non-empirical way.
As a result of the problems associated with (CA) it seems better to work with the 
transmission proposal.
§7 Summary: the road ahead for transmission failure 
compatibilists
It seems that the most plausible statement of the SK paradox is given by what has 
been called the transmission strategy. The statement o f the SK paradox given by the 
transmission strategy is the following could be true of any subject S:
(1) S knows non-empirically that (Wl) I am thinking that water is wet.
(2) (W2) If I am thinking that water is wet, then I’m in a water-world: (i.e. if 
(Wl), then (W3)).
(2a) S knows a priori that (W2).
Therefore,
(3) S knows non-empirically that (W3) I’m in a water-world.
(3) then conjoins with (4) below:
(4) It is not the case S knows non-empirically. that (W3) I’m in a water-world.
In order to derive the absurd conclusion (5):
(5) S knows non-empirically that (W3) and it is not the case that S knows non- 
empirically that (W3).
(From now on I will use ‘SK paradox’ to denote the transmission proposal’s 
statement of the SK paradox).
The transmission strategy method of deriving (3) from (1) and (2a) is to say that S’s 
non-empirical knowledge that (Wl) transmits across the a priori known entailment 
(W2). Hence S acquires non-empirical knowledge that (W3) by way of his non- 
empirical knowledge that (Wl) and a priori knowledge that (W2).
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Let’s call a compatibilist someone who wants to hold that (1) and (2) are true but (5) is 
false. Compatibilists come in two varieties, bullet biting compatibilists deny (4) so they 
can allow that (3) follows from (1) and (2a). Transmission failure compatibilists deny that
(3) follows from (1) and (2a)
The transmission failure compatibilist claims that even if (1) and (2a) are true (3) 
does not follow from (1) and (2a). In order claim this the transmission failure 
compatibilist needs to claim that S cannot acquire non-empirical knowledge that 
(W3) by way of his non-empirical knowledge that (Wl) and a priori knowledge that 
(W2). That is to say, the transmission failure compatibilist needs to deny that S’s 
non-empirical knowledge that (Wl) transmits across the a priori known entailment 
(W2).
What is the transmission failure compatibilist saying? The transmission failure 
compatibilist’s position is that even i f  we, know the contents of our thoughts in a non- 
empirical way and we know that the relevant externalist premise is true a priori, then 
we not, as a result, know empirical propositions in a non-empirical way. The 
transmission failure compatibilist can remain silent over the questions of whether:
(i) we can know what we are thinking non-empirically
(ii) over whether the relevant instance of extemalism is in fact true
(iii) if the relevant instance of extemalism is true, we can know that it is true 
a priori.
For the rest of this thesis I want to investigate the compatibilist’s strategy of denying 
that (3) follows from (1) and (2a). In so doing I too will remain silent over the 
question of whether each of (i), (ii) and (iii) are true.
How does the compatibilist argue that that S’s non-empirical knowledge that (Wl) 
transmits across the a priori known entailment (W2)? Described in broad terms the 
compatibilist makes two steps here. His first step is to argue that certain kinds of 
perceptual knowledge fail to transmit across known entailments and he’ll argue that 
such cases exhibit a certain kind of epistemic structure. His next step is to say that 
this epistemic structure is present in the case of arguments involved in the SK 
paradox. More specifically he’ll say such an epistemic structure is present in the case
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of arguments like (W) when we have non-empirical knowledge of (W)’s major 
premise and a priori knowledge of (W)’s minor premise. Once he’s secured this 
second step the compatibilist concludes that non-empirical knowledge that (Wl) 
does not transmit across the a priori known entailment (W2) and hence (3) cannot be 
derived from (1) and (2).
So to summarise the main steps the compatibilist makes are:
Step 1: A certain epistemic structure is present in the cases where we intuitively think 
a certain kind of perceptual knowledge fails to transmit across a known entailment.
Step 2: The epistemic structure identified in Step 1 is present in the case where we 
have non-empirical knowledge that (Wl) and a priori knowledge that (W2).
Although as we have noted earlier those who argue for failure of knowledge 
transmission usually do so by arguing that the appropriate instance o f warrant 
transmission fails. As we noted pursuing such a strategy is not ideal but we can work 
around it by treating the relevant warrant in the warrant transmission principle as a 
knowledge-sufficient warrant. Hence the analogous steps that transmission failure 
compatibilist makes are:
Step T: Step 1: A certain epistemic structure is present in the cases where we 
intuitively think a certain kind of perceptual warrant fails to transmit across a known 
entailment.
Step 2*: The epistemic structure identified in Step T is present in the case where we 
have non-empirical knowledge that (Wl) and a priori knowledge that (W2).
Step 2* allows the transmission failure compatibilist to conclude S’s non-empirical 
warrant that (Wl) fails to transmit across S’s a priori knowledge that (W2). Hence, 
according to the compatibilist, S cannot gain a non-empirical knowledge sufficient 
warrant (since this is how I am defining warrant) for the consequent of (W2) (which 
is (W3)). Therefore, according to the compatibilist, S does not know (W3) non- 
empirically.
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Chapter 2
Introduction
In this section I want to discuss the first step which the transmission failure 
compatibilist makes. The transmission failure compatibilist argues that certain 
perceptual warrants fail to transmit across known entailments when a certain 
epistemic structure is present.
Two transmission failure compatibilists who make at least this first move are 
Davies17 and Wright18. However, I will not immediately start discussing the 
conditions under which Davies and Wright hold that a certain perceptual warrant 
transmits across a known entailment in this chapter. Before I start discussing Davies 
and Wright I want to set out what I take to two arguments which are at least a good 
rough approximation of how one could argue for the result that certain perceptual 
warrants fail to transmit across a known entailment when a certain epistemic 
structure is in place. The first of these arguments is connected up with some very 
specific theories of how our beliefs are warranted. The second of these arguments is 
more general in the sense that it remains neutral over precisely how our beliefs are 
warranted. Then with these two arguments set out, I shall sketch a number of 
possible responses one can make to them in order to deny or explain away our 
intuition that a certain perceptual warrants fail to transmit across a known 
entailment. I shall do this in §1. The picture I develop in §1 will be useful for 
situating the arguments of Davies and Wright and the responses to them in the latter 
sections. In §21 turn to discussing Wright’s argument that certain warrants fail to 
transmit across known entailments when a certain epistemic structure is present. I 
shall argue that the first two arguments I sketch in §1 is a good rough guide to 
Wright’s position. After this I note some recent responses to Wright’s argument and 
focus in depth on one of them. In §3 I discuss Davies’ argument that certain 
warrants fail to transmit across known entailments. I argue that Davies’ argument is 
a good rough approximation to the second argument I identify in §1. I then argue 
that at least two of the recent criticisms of Davies rest on a misunderstanding of his
17 (2000)
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argument. I then advance my own third criticism of Davies and tentatively suggest 
an amendment Davies can use to sustain his position. §41 summarise the results of 
this Chapter.
§1 Two rough arguments for transmission failure
In this section my goal is to set out two rough and ready arguments to show that a 
certain epistemic structure must be in place for certain perceptual warrants fail to 
transmit across known entailments. I shall conclude that there are two such 
arguments. The first argument (Argument 1) requires that we subscribe to a specific 
theory of warrant whereas the second argument whereas the second argument 
(Argument 2) remains neutral over the theory of warrant assumed. I shall set out 
these arguments in §1.4. In order to do this I need introduce the notion o f an 
undercutting defeater’m  §1.1, a problematically warranted argument in §1.2 and set out some 
theories of how our beliefs warranted in §1.3 before actually setting out the two 
arguments in §1.4. In §1.5 I review some response that can be made to the 
arguments in §1.4, they reveal how some responses to the first argument don’t tell 
against the second argument and that our intuitions in the transmission failure cases 
trade on some general principles about the nature of warrant.
§1.1 Undercutting defeaters
A prim a facie warrant for believing a proposition P is a proposition P is a warrant for 
believing P which may or may not have the status of a warrant.
When a prima facie warrant, w, in fact has the status as a warrant, I shall say w is a 
genuine warrant. When a prima facie warrant, w, in fact has the status as a warrant, I 
shall say w is not a genuine warrant
For example, my perceptual experiences of a zebra give me a prima facie warrant for, 
w, believing (Zl) that animal is a zebra. But my warrant w can be defeated in a 
number of ways. For example, I could be told by a trustworthy source ‘a fox is 
always kept in the pen’ where you say you see a zebra. Or a trustworthy source
18 (2000), (2001) and (2003)
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could tell me *1 slipped hallucinogenic drugs in your coffee before we went to walk 
around the zoo today*. In the first example, the warranting status of, w, remains but 
there may be good reasons (a trustworthy source telling me things to the contrary) 
which count against my prima facie warrant, w, for believing (Zl). In the second 
example, it seems as though my believing that I am under the influence of a 
hallucinogenic drug removed the warranting status of my prima facie warrant w. I 
shall be concerned with the latter type of defeaters in this section.19
For any rational subject, S: a proposition cp is an undercutting defeater S’s prima facie 
warrant, w, for believing P iff S’s belief that cp removes warranting status as a 
warrant for believing P.
The idea of an undercutting defeater is in standard circumstances S’s prima facie 
warrant, #>, for believing P would be a warrant for believing P but in the 
circumstances that S believes cp, S’s belief that cp would rationally prevent S from 
taking w as a warrant for believing P.20
For example, suppose I have a (prima facie) warrant, w, for believing that that is an 
orange on the basis of my visual experience of an orange and suppose it is true that 
I’m having a hallucination o f an orange when in fact there is no orange there. Now 
in such a case, if I be come aware of the proposition ‘I ’m having a hallucination of 
an orange when in fact there is no orange there’, then it removes the capacity of my 
visual experiences to provide a warrant for believing that that is an orange. So I’m 
having a hallucination of an orange when in fact there is no orange there is an 
undercutting defeater for my prima facie warrant w. What about making the 
following modification to this example: it is false that I’m having a hallucination of 
an orange when in fact there is no orange there but I nonetheless believe this 
falsehood. In the modified case is the status of my prima facie warrant, w, removed? 
I think the intuition here is ‘yes’ provided that we are dealing with rational subjects. 
If  I believed that I’m having a hallucination of an orange when in fact there is no 
orange there, then it would not be rational of me to regard my visual experiences o f 
an orange as giving me a warrant for believing that that is an orange.
19 These distinctions between kinds of defeaters may bear some relation to Type-I and Type-II 
defeaters in Pollock (1974), p41 ff.
20 It’s difficult to say what would happen in a case where the subject is not rational
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Here’s another example. Suppose I have the typical prima facie visual warrant, w, 
for believing (Zl) that animal is a zebra and suppose I believe not-(Z3) is true, that 
is, I believe that that animal is a mule cleverly disguised as a zebra. In this case if I 
am behaving rationally I would regard my visual experience of a zebra as not giving 
me a warrant for (Zl). Hence, not-(Z3) is an undercutting defeater for my (prima 
facie) visual warrant, w, for believing (Zl) since if I believed not-(Z3), the warranting 
status o f my typical prima facie visual warrant w would be removed.
Note that not-(Z3) is not the only undercutting defeater for my typical perceptual 
warrant, w, for believing (Zl); I list some propositions which are undercutting 
defeaters for w below:
(Nl) My perceptual faculties are working correctly.
(N3) I am not a brain in a vat having the perceptual experience that that animal is a 
zebra.
(N3) I have not recently had hallucinogenic drugs slipped in the coffee he drank just 
before having his perceptual experience of the zebra 
and so on to (Nn).
Note also that the notion of an undercutting defeater is as I have sketched it is just a 
relation between two propositions and a certain warrant for believing one of those 
propositions and hence an undercutting defeater makes no strong demands on what 
it is for a belief to be warranted. That is to say, the notion o f an undercutting 
defeater alone does not say in order for S’s prima facie warrant, w, for believing P to 
be a warrant for believing P, S is required to have a warrant to (or for) believing all 
undercutting defeaters for w are false. Certain theories o f how our beliefs are 
warranted may secure such a requirement. There is, however, one weak demand the 
notion of an undercutting defeater makes on a theory of warrant: in order for a 
prima facie warrant, w, for believing P to have the status of a warrant for a rational 
subject, S, S cannot have beliefs that any undercutting defeaters for w are true.
Consider a slightly different case where I have a different prima facie warrant, w*, 
for believing (Zl). Suppose that w* consists in both my having a visual experience 
o f a zebra and an auditory experience of that zebra making a braying noise which no
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other animal can make. Is not-(Z3) an undercutting defeater for my warrant, w*, for 
believing (Zl)? Would my belief that the animal is a cleverly disguised mule, remove 
the warranting status of my prima facie warrant w*? I want to suggest that such a 
belief would not remove the warranting status of a prima facie warrant w*. Provided 
I recognise that the braying noise I am aware of can only be made by a zebra, then 
the rational thing for me to do would be to discard my belief that the animal is a 
cleverly disguised mule.21 This is because, should I recognise that any animal except 
for a zebra, including a cleverly disguised mule, cannot make such a braying noise, 
the rational thing for me to do would be to stop believing that the animal is a 
cleverly disguised mule. Let us bear this case in mid when we revisit our intuitions 
about perceptual warrant transmission in the next subsection.
§1.2 Problematically warranted arguments
Cast your mind back to the following results in Chapter 1:
(a) One result was that I could have a typical perceptual warrant ,w, for believing 
(Zl) that animal is a zebra gained from a visual experience of a zebra. And our 
intuition was that w does not transmit across the known entailment (Z2) if that 
animal is a zebra, then it is not a cleverly disguised mule.
(b) A second result was that I could have an extraordinary perceptual warrant, w*, 
for believing (Wl) gained from having both the visual experience of a zebra and the 
zebra making a braying noise which no other animal can make. And our intuition 
was that when I had the warrant, w*, for believing (Zl) it did transmit across the 
known entailment (Z2).
As we saw in the last subsection not-(Z3) (i.e. the animal a cleverly disguised mule) 
was an undercutting defeater for my warrant w above but not for my warrant w*. 
These results may indicate that there is a connection between the failure o f a certain 
warrant, to transmit across a known entailment when the consequent of that 
entailment says that the undercutting defeater of that warrant is false.
21 Remember, I’m taking ‘cleverly disguised mule’ to mean ‘a mule cleverly disguised to look like a 
zebra’
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For example, (Z3) says that the undercutting defeater for my warrant, w, for 
believing (Zl) is false. Now our intuition was that w failed to transmit across the 
known entailment (Z2). On the other hand, (Z3) does not say anything about 
whether the undercutting defeaters for w* are false and our intuition was w* 
transmitted across the known entailment (Z2). I want to suggest that this feature 
goes some way to explaining why we have the intuitions we do about whether certain 
warrants transmit across known entailments. In order to develop this suggestion I 
want to introduce the notion of a problematically warranted argument.
An argument O where S has a warrant, w, for believing the major premise o f O is a 
problematically warranted argument iii
(i) O  is o f the form [A, (if A, then B) therefore B]22
(ii) S has a warrant, w, for believing A
(iii) S knows that (if A, then B)
(iv) not-B is an undercutting defeater for S’s warrant, w, for believing A.
Note that whether a certain argument is problematically warranted depends on both 
the premises of the argument itself and the type of warrant S has for believing the 
major premise of the argument (premise A). In order to see this consider the next 
few examples.
Example 1:
Recall, the (Z) argument. The argument is of the form [A, (if A, then B) therefore B] 
so it satisfies condition (i) above. My typical visual experiences o f a zebra providing 
me with a warrant, w, for believing (Zl) satisfying condition (ii) above. It is 
uncontroversial that I know that (Z2) satisfying condition (iii) above. And we have 
already noted not-(Z3) is n undercutting defeater for my warrant, w, for believing 
(Zl) satisfying condition (iv) above. In this case we would say that the (Z) argument
22 This notion could be extend for arguments of other forms too but for my 
purposes I won’t need to do that here.
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where I have the warrant, w, for believing (Zl) argument is a problematically 
warranted argument.
Example 2:
Now suppose instead of w, my warrant for believing (Zl) is the warrant w* as 
described above which is furnished both by my visual experience of a zebra and my 
auditory experience of the zebra making a distinctive braying noise. Conditions (i),
(ii) and (iii) are satisfied as before. However, condition (iv) is not satisfied: as we 
have seen not-(Z3) is not an undercutting defeater for my warrant for believing (Zl). 
Hence, the (Z) argument where I have the warrant, w* (rather than w), for believing 
(Zl) is a not a problematically warranted argument. So here the argument remains 
the same as in example 1 but the warrant for believing its major premise has been 
changed and this changes the argument’s status as a problematically warranted 
argument.
Example 3:
Suppose now that I have the warrant w for believing (Zl) (as defined in example 1). 
But in this case I consider the following argument:
(Z-)
(Zl) That animal is a zebra.
(Z’2) If  that animal is a zebra, then it is not a mule.
Therefore,
(Z’3) That animal is not a mule.
It is uncontroversial that I know that (Z’2). Again conditions (i), (ii) and (iii) above 
are satisfied. Is condition (iv) above satisfied? Is not-(Z’3) is an undercutting 
defeater for my warrant, w, for believing (Zl)? The answer here is ‘no’ since if I 
believed the animal was a mule and I acquired a typical visual warrant for believing 
(Zl), then it would be rational for me to stop believing that the animal is a mule. 
Hence, here my warrant, w, for believing (Zl) has remained the same as in example 1 
but changing the relevant premise o f the argument (the B proposition in the
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template), results in the argument (Z5) where I have warrant, w, for believing (Zl) 
not being a problematically warranted argument. The same explanation here follows 
mutatis mutandis for the argument (F) when we have a typical perceptual warrant for 
(F)’s major premise.
I think having an argument with a certain warrant for its major premise which is 
problematically warranted does not in itself entail that such a problematically 
warranted argument is a case where this warrant fails to transmit across the minor 
premise of such an argument. I think certain other assumptions about accounts of 
how our beliefs are warranted and what it is for something to count as a warrant may 
in fact secure this result. In order to reach this conclusion I shall discuss accounts of 
warrant in the next sub-section.
§1.3 Accounts of warrant
Using the notion introduced above I want to introduce several theories of warranty 
theories of the necessary conditions that need to obtain in order for us to have a 
warrant for believing a proposition. These various theories of warrant will be helpful 
when it comes to discerning the epistemic structure which obtains in the cases where 
we have an intuition that there is a transmission failure. The accounts of warrant set 
out here are modifications of the accounts o f warrant set out by Pryor (ms) but with 
some important differences. Pryor uses the term ‘rests on* or ‘rests in part on* 
whereas I do not. Also my notion of a warrant for believing is different from 
Pryor’s. However even with these similarities I think the theories o f warrant are 
roughly the same as the accounts of warrant used in Pyror (ms).
In order to discuss the accounts of how our beliefs are warranted below I need 
introduce the notion of one warrant being independent from another. The intuitive 
idea is that:
For any subject S: S’s warrant, w*, for believing (or to believe) P is independent of 
S’s warrant, #H-, to believe (or for believing) iff S did not use her warrant #H- in 
obtaining her warrant #>*.
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The conservative account of warrant says for any subject S:
S’s prima facie warrant, w, for believing P is a warrant only ifS  has a warrant (or 
warrants), independent of w, to believe that each of the undercutting defeaters for w 
are false.
So for example, suppose I have the typical prima fade perceptual warrant w for 
believing (Zl). Then on the conservative account of warrant in order for w to be I 
warrant I need to have a warrant, independent of w,(or warrants independent o f w) 
to believe that each undercutting defeater for w is false. That is to say, I need to 
have a warrant (or warrants), independent of w, to believe each proposition from 
(Nl) to (Nn) below is false:
(Nl) My perceptual faculties are not working correctly.
(N3) I am a brain in a vat having the perceptual experience that that animal is a 
zebra.
(N3) I have recendy had hallucinogenic chugs slipped in the coffee he drank just 
before having his perceptual experience of the zebra
(Nn)
where (Nl) to (Nn) range over all o f the undercutting defeaters for my warrant, w, 
for believing (Zl).
In order to set out the weak conservative account (to be defined below) I need to 
introduce the notion of an entitlement to believe a proposition.
Any subject, S, has an entidement to believe P iff S has no sufficient reason to 
believe that P is false and S has some sort of justification to believe that P needn’t 
have been acquired or earned.
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On this view, ‘entitlement’ can be seen as having a more primitive epistemic status 
than Varrant’ whereas warrant is usually (though not always) acquired through 
evidence or arguments or operation of some reliable faculty perception or reasoning, 
and so on. Entitlement, on the other hand, need not be acquired or earned in this 
way. Moreover, an entitlement could be an a priori notion or it may not be. We may 
have an entitlement for P for pragmatic reasons or for other reasons. Moreover, if S 
has an entitlement to believe P, S need not at this moment (or indeed ever) in fact 
believe P or think that P. Also, entitlement can be defeated: if S comes to possess 
sufficient reason that P is false. Again this is a vague notion o f entitlement but it will 
do for the purposes of fleshing out this account. The key thing here is that 
entitlement in this sense is not merely lacking evidence. Moreover warrant need not 
be something a subject possesses just by virtue of being a rational subject.
The weak conservative account of warrant says for any subject S:
S’s prima facie warrant, #>, for believing P is a warrant only tfS  has an entitlement (or 
entitlements), independent of wy to believe that each of the undercutting defeaters 
for w are false.
For example, on the weak conservative account of warrant my typical prima facie 
perceptual warrant, w, for believing (Zl) is a warrant only if I have entitlement (or 
entitlements) to believe each of the propositions (Nl) to (Nn) below are false:
(Nl) My perceptual faculties are not working correctly.
(N3) I am a brain in a vat having the perceptual experience that that animal is a 
zebra.
(N3) I have recently had hallucinogenic drugs slipped in the coffee he drank just 
before having his perceptual experience of the zebra
(Nn)
where (Nl) to (Nn) range over all o f the undercutting defeaters for my warrant, w, 
for believing (Zl).
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I shall use the term conservative accounts of warrant to refer to both the conservative 
account o f warrant and weak conservative account of warrant.
What about the rival accounts of warrant to the conservative account of warrant? 
There are broadly two accounts which rival the conservative account o f warrant.
The liberal and intermediate accounts of warrant deny the main thesis of the 
conservative accounts of warrant that:
For any subject, S, S’s prima facie warrant, wt for believing P is a warrant only ifS  has 
either an entidement (or entidements) or a warrant (or warrants), independent of w, 
to believe that each of the undercutting defeaters for w are false.
The liberal account of warrant says that for any subject S:
S’s prima facie warrant, w, for believing P is a warrant only if S lacks evidence that 
each of the undercutting defeaters for w are true.
For example, on the liberal account of warrant my typical prima facie perceptual 
warrant for (Zl) is a warrant provided I lack evidence that each o f the propositions 
(Nl) to (Nn) are true:
(Nl) My perceptual faculties are not working correctly.
(N3) I am a brain in a vat having the perceptual experience that that animal is a 
zebra.
(N3) I have recently had hallucinogenic drugs slipped in the coffee he drank just 
before having his perceptual experience of the zebra
(Nn)
where (Nl) to (Nn) range over all o f the undercutting defeaters for my warrant, w, 
for believing (Zl).
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The intermediate account of warrant says that for any subject S:
S’s prima facie warrant, n>, for believing P is a warrant only if S lacks evidence that 
each o f the undercutting defeaters for w are true and in fact the undercutting 
defeaters for w are false.
For example, on the intermediate account of warrant my typical prima facie 
perceptual warrant for (Zl) is a warrant provided I lack evidence that each of the 
propositions (Nl) to (Nn) are true and in fact the propositions (Nl) to (Nn) are 
false:
(Nl) My perceptual faculties are not working correcdy.
(N3) I am a brain in a vat having the perceptual experience that that animal is a 
zebra.
(N3) I have recendy had hallucinogenic drugs slipped in the coffee he drank just 
before having his perceptual experience of the zebra
(Nn)
where (Nl) to (Nn) range over all of the undercutting defeaters for my warrant, w, 
for believing (Zl).
One of the crucial differences between the conservative accounts o f warrant and the 
liberal and intermediate accounts are that they in order for a subject’s typical prima 
facie warrant for believing a proposition do not require that the subject bother about 
propositions which are undercutting defeaters for w in the sense that the subject 
need not have beliefs about such defeaters or have any positive warrant or 
entitlement to believe that such defeaters are false.
Note that Pryor has commented that that a reliabilist, who roughly says our belief 
that P is warranted iff it is produced and sustained by a reliable process, may fall into
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the intermediate category. Whereas, internalists, those who say, roughly, our beliefs 
are warranted depending on what it is like from the subject’s perspective, will take a 
liberal or conservative line.23 I’m not going to make a commitment as to what, if 
any, theories of warrant above reliabilists or internalists would subscribe to but it 
may be that Pryor’s remarks carry over for my accounts of warrant above too.
23 Pryor (ms) p9.
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§1.4 Transmission Failure and theories of warrant
Having set out what I mean by the various accounts o f warrant above and what a 
problematically warranted argument is, I now want to suggest can use these notions 
together with certain other assumptions about what constitute a warrant to give an 
argument for the conclusion that certain warrants fail to transmit across known 
entailments.
Before I give these arguments it is worth thinking about our intuitions in the 
transmission failure cases again. Our intuition is that my warrant for believing (Zl) 
(that animal is a zebra) fails to transmit across the known entailment (Z2) if that 
animal is a zebra, then it is not a cleverly disguised mule. We have this intuition 
because, we think my typical perceptual warrant for (Zl) in some sense ‘presupposes* 
or ‘assumes* (Z3) in order for my typical perceptual warrant for (Zl) to count as a 
warrant The arguments below will sharpen this extremely rough intuition.
§1.4.a Argument 1:
Argument 1 starts off from the plausible claim that there are problematically 
warranted arguments:
Problematically warranted argument premise:
(PWA)
O is a problematically warranted argument (hence O is of the form [A, (if A, then B), 
therefore B]) where S has a warrant, w, for believing A.
The argument then claims (PWA) entails the following claim:
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Principle of independent entitlement claim:
(PIE)
In order to have a warrant, w, for believing A in the problematically warranted 
argument <I>, S is required to have a warrant or entitlement for B which is 
independent of w.
The argument then deploys the premise below:
Additional warrant claim:
(AWC):
I f  S’s warrant for believing A in the problematically warranted argument O requires S 
to have a warrant or entitlement for B which is independent of w, then S cannot 
obtain any kind of new warrant for B by way of his warrant, w, for believing A and 
his knowledge that (if A, then B).
An alternative way of putting (AWC) is:
I f  S's warrant for believing A in the problematically warranted argument <I> requires S 
to have a warrant or entitlement for B which is independent of w, then S’s warrant, w, 
for believing A fails to transmit across the known entailment (if A, then B).
By modus ponens on (AWC) and (PIE) we reach the conclusion that any 
problematically warranted argument where S has warrant, w, for believing the 
argument’s major premise is a transmission failure.
In brief argument 1 is: Assume (PWA). (PIE) follows from (PWA). Assume 
(AWC). Then when combined with the additional premise (AWC), (PIE) results in 
the conclusion that any problematically warranted argument where S has warrant, w, 
for believing the argument’s major premise is a transmission failure. So Argument 1 
S’s warrant, w, for believing A ‘presupposes’ or ‘assumes’ B in order for the warrant 
w to count as a warrant.
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The conservative accounts of warrant hold that (PIE) always follows from (PWA) for 
the following reasons. They hold that in order to have a warrant, w, for believing A, 
S needs entitlement or warrant, independent of w, to believe that each undercutting 
defeater for w is false. Since (PWA) stipulates O is a problematically argument, not- 
B is an undercutting defeater for w. Hence, on the conservative accounts of warrant, 
S requires warrant or entitlement, independent o f w, to believe B (i.e. to believe not- 
B is false) in order for w to count as a warrant for believing A.
In contrast to the conservative accounts of warrant, the liberal and intermediate 
accounts of warrant do not hold that (PIE) always follows from (PWA). Rather, the 
intermediate or liberal accounts of warrant will say (PIE) follows from (PWA) 
depending on what kind of warrant the warrant w is. For the liberal account of 
warrant the bare minimum requirement for a prima facie warrant, w, for believing P 
to count as a warrant S needs to lack evidence that undercutting defeaters for w are 
true. Hence, for the liberal when only just this bare minimum requirement is met in 
the case of the problematically warranted argument, S only lacks evidence that not-B 
is true. S does not have warrant or entitlement to believe B which is independent of 
w in this case. Hence, for a liberal account of warrant, when only its bare minimum 
requirement on warrant is met, (PIE) does not follow from (PWA).
However, if the liberal account of warrant is correct, one can go beyond its bare 
minimum requirements in order to have a warrant for a certain proposition. For 
example, rather than just lacking evidence that not-B is false, in the last example, S 
could go out and acquire positive evidence that B is true and hence obtain a warrant, 
independent of w, to believe B (or even for believing). In this modified example S 
does in fact have a warrant, independent of w, to believe B. So in this modified 
example, the liberal would say that (PIE) does follow from (PWA). So the key 
conclusion here is that the liberal account of warrant does not hold that (PIE) always 
follow from (PWA). Similarly the intermediate account of warrant would say (PIE) 
does not always follow from (PWA).
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§1.4.b Argument 2:
In contrast to argument 1, argument 2 does not require us to subscribe to any 
particular theory of warrant. In order to set out argument 2 ,1 need to set out what I 
mean by an alternative to a proposition.
An alternative to a proposition 0 is a proposition n, distinct from 0, which entails that 
0 is false.
For example, some of the alternatives to (Z3) that animal is not a cleverly disguised 
mule could be:
The animal is a cleverly disguised mule and the British Library is located in Spain.
The animal is a cleverly disguised mule and the zoo where this mule is located is run 
by a dishonest zookeeper who is trying to hoax visitors.
Note that the alternatives to (Z3) needn’t themselves be true, they simply have to 
entail (Z3) is false.
Argument 2 again starts off with the premise (PWA).
Problematically warranted argument premise.
(PWA)
O is a problematically warranted argument of the form [A, (if A, then B), therefore 
B] where S has a warrant, w, for believing A.
It then claims (PWA) entails the following claim:
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The failing to rule out alternatives clainr.
(FROA)
S’s prima facie warrant for believing B by way of his warrant, w, for believing A and 
his knowledge that (if A, then B) cannot rule out any alternatives to B.
Argument 2 then adds a second premise called the ruling out alternatives clainr.
(ROA)
For any proposition P: a prima facie warrant w is a warrant for believing P is a 
genuine warrant only if w rules out some of the alternatives to P.
The consequence of (FROA) and (ROA) is that S’s prima facie warrant for believing 
B by way of his warrant, w, for believing A and his knowledge that (if A, then B) is 
not a genuine warrant. Hence, S does not obtain a warrant for believing B by way of 
his warrant, w, for believing A and his knowledge that (if A, then B). That is to say 
S’s warrant w fails to transmit across the known entailment (if A, then B).
(PFW) and (ROA) have the consequence that any problematically warranted 
argument is a failure of S’s warrant, w, for believing A to transmit across the known 
entailment (if A, then B) since cannot obtain a genuine warrant for B by way of his 
warrant w for believing A and his knowledge of the entailment.
Note that Argument 2 is much more of a threat than Argument 1 because it does not 
require us to subscribe to any particular account of warrant in order to reach the 
conclusion that problematically warranted arguments are transmission failures.
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§1.5 Responses to the arguments
In this section I want to look at how one can respond to the arguments for 
transmission failure in the last subsection. This will help us situate the responses to 
Davies and Wright later on in the chapter.
§1.5.a Responses to Argument 1:
The most obvious response to argument 1 is to advocate a liberal or intermediate 
account of warrant. This response allows that (PIE) does not always follow from 
(PWA) depending on what warrant one has for the major premise A of the 
problematically warranted argument. However, this response is quite weak, in that, 
even when it doesn’t allow us to derive (PIE) from (PWA), it still faces a threat from 
Argument 2. Why does this response face a threat from argument 2? It does so 
because Argument 2 remains neutral over what account of warrant is the correct 
account.
A second response to Argument 1 is to deny the (AWC) premise.
Additional warrant claim:
(AWC):
I f  S’s warrant, w, for believing A in the problematically warranted argument <D 
requires S to have a warrant or entitlement for B which is independent o f w, then S 
cannot obtain any kind of new warrant for B by way o f his warrant, w, for believing 
A and his knowledge that (if A, then B).
This response says that even if it is granted S’s warrant, w, for believing A in the 
problematically warranted argument Q requires S to have a warrant or entitlement 
for B which is independent o f w, S still in fact can obtain some kind of a new 
warrant for B by way of his warrant, w, for believing A and his knowledge that (if A, 
then B).
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Let’s see what this response amounts to in the case of the (Z) argument. Suppose I 
have a prima facie warrant, w, for believing (Zl) on the basis of my typical visual 
experiences of a zebra. Suppose further that I have warrant or entitlement, 
independent of w, to believe that each undercutting defeater for w is false. Hence, 
on any account of warrant my prima facie warrant w is in fact a genuine warrant. 
Now suppose that I deny (AWC) and I say
‘I’ve acquired a new warrant, lets call this w+, for believing (Z3) by way of my 
warrant, w, for believing (Zl).’
It seems that I would be open to the following sorts o f retorts:
(i) ‘Your warrant w+ for believing (Z3) is no genuine warrant at all, it does not give 
you an additional reason to believe (Z3) in the sense that it does not allow you to rule 
out any alternatives to (Z3).’
(ii) Tf you are rational and you doubted (Z3) w+ would not resolve your doubt.’
(iii) I f  you are rational and doubted (Z3), then you would revisit the (Z) argument. 
This would lead you to doubt the conjunction of the premises. You would grant 
that we know (Z2) and hence doubt (Zl). Then when you examine the prima facie 
warrant you have for (Zl) your prima facie warrant, w, for believing and note that it 
does nothing to resolve your doubt that the animal is a cleverly disguised mule. 
Hence your warrant w+ for believing (Z3) will do nothing to resolve you’re your 
doubt about (Z3) since it is obtained in part by way of your warrant w.’
However, these retorts seem to be trading on certain principles about warrant:
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Warrant and rational doubt principle:
(WRD)
For any prima facie warrant w for a proposition P: if w is a genuine warrant for 
believing (or to believe) P, then u> is able to resolve the doubt o f a rational subject 
about P.
And the following premise from Argument 2. The ruling out alternatives claim-.
(ROA)
For any warrant prima facie warrant w for a proposition P: if w is a genuine warrant 
for believing (or to believe) P, then w is able to rule out some alternatives to P.
Pm not going to take a position on whether the above principles of warrant are true. 
Indeed the truth of the above principles has recendy been a matter of controversy24. 
All I want to point out is that if I were to reject the above principles about warrant, 
then I could say that my warrant w+ for believing (Z3) is a genuine warrant. Hence, 
if I were to take w+ as a genuine warrant I would have to concede that it is of 
extremely limited strength in that it could not persuade any rational doubter about 
(Z3) (including myself), nor could it rule out any alternatives to (Z3).
If  we deny (WRD) and (FRO A) then it seems to bring out a distinction between two 
types of transmission principles.
Strong warrant transmission principle.
For any subject S and any proposition P and any proposition Q: if S has a warrant, w> 
for believing P and S knows P entails Q, then S has a strong warrant for believing Q 
by way of his warrant w for believing P and knowledge that P entails Q.
24 See Boghossian’s ‘principle of the universal accessibility of reasons* (2000, p253). 
See also reliabilist justifications of induction.
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Where a strong warrant for believing a proposition ^ is a warrant which resolves 
rational doubt about and rules out some alternatives to c|>.
Weak warrant transmission principle:
For any subject S and any proposition P and any proposition Q: if S has a warrant, w, 
for believing P and S knows P entails Q, then S has a weak warrant for believing Q 
by way of his warrant w for believing P and knowledge that P entails Q.
Where a weak warrant for believing a proposition is a warrant which does not 
resolve rational doubt about or does not rule out any alternatives to <]>.
While the strong warrant transmission principle is false for problematically warranted 
arguments, the weak warrant transmission principle is true.
§1.5.b Response to Argument 2:
The response to Argument 2 is more or less along the same lines as the last response 
to Argument 1. The typical response is to deny the (ROA) premise.
(ROA)
For any proposition P: a prima facie warrant w is a warrant for believing P is a 
genuine warrant only if w rules out some of the alternatives to P.
Again I do not want to endorse the denial of (ROA) here. However, if I denied 
(ROA), then I could say the following about the zebra case just considered:
‘My warrant w+ for believing (Z3) is a genuine warrant but it is of extremely limited 
strength in that it cannot rule out any alternatives to (Z3).’
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Hence we deny that the relevant strong transmission principle is true in this case and 
allowing that the relevant instance of the weak transmission principle is true in this 
case.
In this section that follows I want to suggest that there is strong textual evidence to 
show that Wright is committed to something along the lines of Argument 1 and 
Davies is committed to something along the lines of Argument 2. Hence, the 
response to the arguments we have considered in this section will help us to situate 
the type criticisms many commentators raise against Davies and Wright.
§2 Wright (2000)
§2.1 Exposition of Wright
To what extent can Wright (2000) be held to subscribe to Argument 1? There is no 
direct evidence that Wright would subscribe to (PWA). This is where we need to 
examine Wright’s (2000) template for transmission failure.
On Wright’s (2000) template25 (what I shall call the A-B-C  template) an argument of 
the form [A, (A, then B), therefore B] fails to be a case where a certain warrant [w] 
for A transmits across the known entailment if A, then B when there is some 
proposition C such that:
(i) A entails B.
(ii) My warrant [w] for A consists in my being in a state which is subjectively
indistinguishable from a state in which the relevant C would be true.
(iii) C is incompatible with A.
(iv) C would be true, if B were false.
According to Wright the argument (Z) meets the template with A=(Z1) that animal 
is a zebra B=(Z3) that animal is not a cleverly disguised mule and C=not-(Z3) that 
animal is a cleverly disguised mule. The argument obviously meets conditions (i), (ii)
25 Wright (2000), pl55
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and (iii) o f the template. And condition (ii) is satisfied S could be in a state 
subjectively indistinguishable from his actual state in which C the animal is a cleverly 
disguised mule and not a zebra when he has a typical perceptual warrant for A.
Now does this template commit Wright to (PWA)? I think it does. Suppose we take 
any problematically warranted argument [<j>, (if then 0), therefore 0] where S has 
warrant, w for believing <J>. If  we put C = not-0, then condition (iv) is satisfied. If 
not-0, then not -4  since by assumption if tp, then 0. Hence, for A = and C = not-0 
condition (iii) is satisfied. Is condition (ii) satisfied A = and C = not-0? I think 
‘yes’ since because by assumption not-0 is an undercutting defeater for S’s warrant, w, 
for believing 4*, then if it were true that not-0, S would still be in the same state he 
would be in which he has warrant, w for believing <|j. So Wright is committed to 
some premise similar to (PWA) but his template may commit him to something 
much stronger than this premise as we shall see in §2.1.
Given condition (ii) why do we claim S has a warrant for believing A, rather than just 
saying S has a warrant for the more tentative disjunction (A or C)? For example, 
why do we claim S has a warrant for believing that animal is a zebra as a result o f his 
visual typical experiences of a zebra rather than claiming S has a warrant for 
believing that animal is a zebra or that animal is a cleverly disguised mule? Here is 
where Wright’s commitment to one of the conservative accounts of warrant 
becomes relevant (and hence his commitment to the (PIE) claim). On Wright’s view 
in order to have a warrant for believing A, we require warrant ore entidement to 
believe C is false (which is independent of our warrant for believing A). Hence, 
according to Wright in order to have a warrant for believing (Zl) we require a 
warrant or entidement to believe not-(Z3) which is independent of our warrant for 
believing (Zl).
There is some textual evidence to suggest Wright would subscribe to (PIE).
“So it would seem I must have an appreciable entidement to affirm B already, 
independent of the recognition of its entailment by A” (2000, p i 55)
There is also evidence that Wright subscribes to something like (AWC).
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“While you have-no doubt quite properly-taken it for granted the conditions were 
generally suitable for the acquisition of reliable information by purely perceptual 
means, it would be absurd to pretend you had gained a reason for thinking so — at 
least in the specific respects that you didn’t have to reckon with disguised mules or 
deceptive lighting — just by dint of the fact those specific possibilities are logically 
excluded by the beliefs which, courtesy of your background assumption, you have 
now confirmed” (2000, p i 54)
§2.2 Responses to Wright
There are a number of criticisms that can be made about Wright’s template. The 
first criticism is that Wright is committed to one of the conservative accounts of 
warrant and many philosophers would reject this account o f warrant and this 
account of warrant has a number of puzzling or undesirable consequences.26 I shall 
not review this response because even if it is correct such a response would still be 
threatened by Argument 2. The other sort o f criticism is more restricted, it remains 
silent over whether there are any problems with the conservative accounts of warrant 
which Wright subscribes; instead this criticism examines weaknesses in Wright’s A- 
B-C template above and proposes amendments to the template. I’m going to focus 
solely on the last criticism. This is because this criticism may be important when we 
go on to look at Wright’s response to the SK paradox in Chapter 3.
Wright’s (2000) template has been recendy criticised. Consider the following 
argument:
<F>
(FI) The animal in the garbage is a fox.
(F2) If  the animal in the garbage is a fox, then the animal in the garbage is not a cat. 
Therefore,
(F3) The animal in the garbage is not a cat.
26 Pryor (ms) and Brown (2003) and Brown (forthcoming) offer this line of thought.
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Here we have A=(F1) B=(F3) and C=not-(F3). Conditions (i), (ii) and (iii) are 
obviously satisfied. Condition (ii) is also met in certain cases. This case is when my 
warrant for w is given to me on my visual or perceptual experience of a fox (as it 
usually is), then (ii) is also met: there is a case where the warrant w is subjectively 
indistinguishable from a state in which C would be true namely a cat cleverly 
disguised as a fox. Hence, the warrant w in these usual circumstances would fail to 
transmit across the known entailment (F2), according to this template.27
More generally, for any C=not-A, conditions (iii) and (iv) hold for any B entailed by 
A . Moreover, condition (ii) holds in this case provided my warrant w for A consists 
in my being in a state which is subjectively indistinguishable from a state in which 
not-A. Hence the A-B-C templates charges a large number of perfectly good 
arguments with being transmission failures.28
This suggests that any argument with a perceptual warrant w for the relevant A will 
fit the template and hence be a failure of the perceptual warrant to transmit across 
the known entailment if A, then B. This is surely too strong, intuitively we would 
hold that a warrant w does transmit across known entailment in the case of 
arguments like (F). Two amendments to Wright’s template have been offered the 
first is by Wright himself and the second is an amendment made by Brown on 
Wright’s behalf.
Wright (2003) has suggested the following amendment to his template in 2000. The 
amendment is for (iii) to be reformulated as:
(iii*) C is incompatible with the reliable operation of the cognitive capacities involved 
in generating the warrant for A.
“This amendment allows the perceptual warrant for (FI) to be transmitted across the 
known entailment (F2) since neither the supposition the animal is a fox nor the 
supposition the animal is a cat is incompatible with the reliable operation of my 
cognitive faculties” (Brown 2004, p60).
27 Brown (2004) advances this specific example
28 This is McLaughlin (2003) *s general point.
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Unfortunately, it may allow a perceptual warrant w for believing (Zl) to be 
transmitted across the known entailment (Z2) and this is something we intuitively do 
not want and a result which is incompatible with the standard view. Why may such a 
warrant w transmit across the known entailment (Z2)? According to Brown it 
depends on how we individuate cognitive processes and individuate reliability.
“The hypothesis that that animal is a cleverly disguised mule is not incompatible with 
the general reliability of perception, or with the general reliability of the process of 
forming beliefs about an animal’s type on the basis o f appearance. O f course, 
whether we type the relevant belief forming process as perception, or as the process 
o f forming beliefs about an animal’s type on the basis of its appearance, this process 
would not be reliable in forming some particular beliefs, those about the type of 
animal in the 2 0 0  cage.” (Brown 2004, p61)
Brown has suggested on Wright’s behalf perhaps (iii*) could be amended to (iii**) in 
order for the perceptual warrant w to transmit across the (F) argument and not 
across the (Z) argument:
(iii**) If C obtains, then the cognitive capacities involved in generating the warrant 
for A would not be reliable in this particular use.
Other than her suggestion that Wright should replace (iii) with (iii**), Brown has also 
suggested another way in which Wright’s template can be amended to sustain the 
standard view. Brown’s suggestion is to leave (i), (ii) and (iii) the same and replace
(ii) with (ii*):
(ii*) I f  C were true, one would be in a state which is subjectively indistinguishable 
from the state which warrants A.
According to Brown:
“This revised condition neady blocks McLauglin’s objection that, on Wright’s template, warrant fails 
to transmit across every valid argument from A to B where premise A has a non-inferential, non- 
logically conclusive warrant. Suppose with McLauglin that C=not-A. Conditions (iii) and (iv) both 
hold for any B entailed by A. But it does not hold that condition (ii*) holds. Suppose my non- 
inferential warrant for A is not logically conclusive, so 1 could be in a subjectively indistinguishable 
state even if A were false. It follows if C (=not-A) were true, then I could be in a state subjectively
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indistinguishable from that which warrants A, but it does not follow that I would be.” (Brown
2004, p59).
Brown notes this feature allows our typical perceptual warrant to transmit across the 
(F) argument and not transmit across the (Z) argument which is just the result the 
template needs.
I think Brown’s suggestion of replacing (ii) with (ii*) is on the right track to 
amending the template. My only worry would be whether the revised template could 
handle a case like this:
(F )
(FI) The animal in the garbage is a fox.
(F2*) If  the animal in the garbage is a fox, then (the animal in the garbage is not a dog 
and that animal in the garbage is not a cat cleverly disguised as a fox).
Therefore,
(F35) That animal in the garbage is not a dog and that animal in the garbage is not a 
cat cleverly disguised as a fox.
Consider A=(F1) B=(F’3) and C=not-(F3’).
Condition (i) o f the modified template is satisfied. Condition (iv) is satisfied since if 
(F’3) were false, not-(F’3) would be true. Not-(F’3) is incompatible with (FI) since if 
the animal in the garbage is a dog or a cat cleverly disguised as a fox, then that animal 
is not a fox. What does condition (ii*) say? Condition (ii*) is unsatisfied since if C 
were true (the animal in the garbage is a dog or a cat cleverly disguised as a fox, then 
would be in a state subjectively distinguishable from the state which warrants (FI) 
when the animal is a dog.
But intuitively we would see (F1) as a failure of a typical perceptual warrant for (FI) 
to transmit across the known entailment (F’2). So more work may need to be done 
to Wright’s template to rule out cases like the (F5) argument.
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§3 Davies (2000)
1 want to suggest that Davies (2000) gives an argument along the lines of Argument
2 when arguing that certain arguments are transmission failures. Davies argues that 
transmission of warrant across known entailment is subject to the following 
limitation principle (L):
(L): “Epistemic warrant cannot be transmitted from the premises of a valid argument 
to its conclusion, if, for one of the premises, the warrant for that premiss counts as a 
warrant only against the background of certain assumptions and acceptance of those 
assumptions cannot be rationally combined with doubt about the truth of the 
conclusion.” (p402).
Now at the moment (L) does not look to be obviously related to Argument 2. In 
order to see why it is related, we need to look into the arguments which Davies uses 
to establish (L). These arguments seem to be establishing that certain arguments beg 
the question in Jackson’s sense and certain arguments fa il to rule out alternatives to their 
conclusion.
Before I examine these arguments I want to show why Davies, unlike Wright, does 
not need to subscribe to one of the particular accounts of warrant above in order to 
argue that certain arguments are failures of transmission. That is to say, Davies can 
hold either one of the conservative accounts of warrant or a liberal account of 
warrant or an intermediate account of warrant in order to argue that certain 
arguments are failures of transmission. In order to see this note in the passage below 
how Davies seems to allow for two uses ‘background o f certain assumptions* and 
does not commit himself to either one of them:
In this passage Davies is discussing the (M) argument (Davies uses ‘justification 
where I use the term warrant):
(Ml) Here is a hand.
(M2) If  this is a hand, then the external world exists.
Therefore,
(M3) The external world exists.
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“On one account, the background assumption that [(M3)] is one which I am entitled 
to make without justification. The role of this unjustified background assumption in 
the justification of everyday beliefs like [(Ml)] does not prevent those beliefs from 
being knowledge. On the other account, a proper justification for my belief that 
[(Ml)] would have to include justification of [(M3)].” (p401).
So on the first use of ‘background assumptions* Davies is referring to the 
conservative or weak conservative account warrant: in order for S to have a warrant 
for believing (Ml), S requires independent warrant or entitlement to believe (M3).
On the second use of the first passage, Davies holds a liberal or intermediate account 
o f warrant: we just do not need to bother about propositions such as (M3) until 
evidence comes our way that propositions such as (M3) are false. On this liberal or 
intermediate view we merely need to lack evidence that certain propositions such as 
(M3) are false.
If  this reading of Davies above is correct then Pryor (ms, p9-10) is incorrect to label 
Davies as holding conservative account of warrant, since the text clearly suggests 
above that Pryor is not committed to a specific account o f warrant.
I’ll now go on to consider Davies’ discussion of begging the question in Jackson*s sense and 
ruling out relevant alternatives in order to reach the conclusion that a certain epistemic 
structure obtains when we have the intuition that a certain perceptual warrant fails to 
transmit across a known entailment. In particular I will emphasise that Davies must 
combine both o f these discussions to reach this conclusion. Many commentators tend 
to think Davies uses the discussions of begging the question in Jackson’s sense and 
ruling out relevant alternatives separately to discern the epistemic structure which 
obtains in cases where certain perceptual warrants fail to transmit across known 
entailments.29
§3.1.a Davies on begging-the-question in Jackson’s sense
Davies, following Jackson, claims an argument begs the question when the evidence for 
one of the argument’s premises is no evidence relative to the background beliefs of the
29 Brown (forthcoming, Ch 7) may have read Davies in this way.
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audience who are listening to that argument. For example, consider the argument 
(Z) again:
(Z)
(Zl) That animal is a Zebra.
(Z2) If that animal is a Zebra, then that animal is not a cleverly disguised mule. 
Therefore,
(Z3) That animal is not a cleverly disguised mule.
Suppose that the audience who are being advanced (Z) have background beliefs that 
not-(Z3). Perhaps they think that the zoo is involved in a mass hoax of the public in 
the location where (Z) is being advanced or perhaps they believe not-(Z3) for other 
reasons or for no reason at all. In such a case, whatever the audience think of the 
evidence for (Z2), even if the audience take themselves to know (Z2), the perceptual 
evidence offered to them by the speakers assertion o f (Zl) is completely compatible 
with both (Zl) and not-(Zl). Hence the typical perceptual evidence being advanced 
to the audience is no evidence relative to the audiences background belief that not- 
(Z3).
Thus if an audience has background beliefs such that they would deny that the 
evidence for the premises is any evidence, then this a case of question-beggingj&r this 
particular audience. The argument need not be question begging for the speaker, he 
may have background beliefs such that his evidence for one of the premises does 
count as evidence. Similarly, an argument may be question begging for one audience 
but not another. It may be that a different audience has background beliefs relative 
to which the evidence borrowed from the speaker is evidence.
So far question beggingfor certain audiences has been described. For Davies an 
argument is question-begging proper i t  and only if
“An argument to a given conclusion is such that anyone — or anyone sane- who 
doubted the conclusion would have background beliefs relative to which the 
evidence for the premises will be no evidence.” (p i l l ,  Jackson.).
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Thus, the audience used to assess whether an argument is question-begging proper is 
anyone — or anyone sane — who doubts the conclusion. So for example, anyone or anyone 
sane who doubts (Z3) will take the typical perceptual evidence for (Zl) as no 
evidence relative to this background belief that not-(Z3), according to Davies, hence 
(Z) is question-begging proper.
Note that in the giving this description of a question-begging proper argument I 
have used the (Z) argument where the person advancing the argument has the typical 
visual warrant, w, for believing (Zl). As we noted earlier (Z) where S has the typical 
visual warrant, w, for believing (Zl) is a problematically warranted argument. So 
could it be that when an argument is question-begging proper, it is in some way 
connected to what I have called a problematically warranted argument? I think ‘yes’. 
What is the precise connection between an argument which begs the question proper 
and a problematically warranted argument?
Recall, an argument O  where S has a warrant, w, for believing A is a problematically 
warranted argument iff
(i) O is of the form [A, (if A, then B) therefore B]
(ii) S has a warrant, w, for believing A
(iii) S knows that (if A, then B)
(iv) not-B is an undercutting defeater for S’s warrant, w, for believing A 
Recall the definition o f an undercutting defeater:
For any rational subject, S: a proposition cp is an undercutting defeater Sis prima facie 
warrant, w, for believing P iff S’s belief that cp removes n?s warranting status as a 
warrant for believing P.
Now if I believe not-B, then my warrant prima facie warrant, w, for believing A will 
not be a warrant at all. Hence when I believe not-B, the argument <D where I have 
the warrant, w for believing A is not a problematically warranted argument since I do 
not have the warrant, w, for believing A (i.e. condition (ii)) above is not satisfied. 
Suppose we take doubt about 0 as a belief that not-0, then when an argument is
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question begging proper, anyone sane who doubts the conclusion of the relevant 
argument, will take it that certain prima facie warrants for at least one of the 
arguments premises is no warrant relative to their doubt. In the absence of doubt, a 
sane or rational person considering a question begging proper argument may take it 
that her prima facie warrant for believing the at least one of the premises of the 
argument is a genuine warrant. This seems to indicate that if T1 is a question begging 
proper argument where a subject does not have doubt about W’s conclusion, then W 
is a problematically warranted argument.
So the main point here is that in establishing that certain arguments are question 
begging proper, I think Davies has effectively found another way of individuating 
problematically warranted arguments. Hence, Davies subscribes to something like 
(PWA).
§3.1.b Davies on arguments failing to rule out alternatives to their conclusion
Why couldn’t Davies just stop after establishing arguments where we have certain 
prima facie warrants for believing their conclusion are question-begging-proper 
arguments? If  Davies stops at this point he is faced with at least two problems.
First, a question begging proper argument where any sane person has a doubt about 
the conclusion of the argument will not be a case of transmission failure. Why not? 
Since the sane or rational person doubts the conclusion he would normally take at 
least one of the typical prima facie warrants for the premises of A to not be a 
genuine warrant for A. Hence, one of the necessary conditions for transmission 
failure cases is absent, namely the condition that a person have a typical warrant the 
major premise o f the argument. The second problem can be seen if we consider a 
case of a question-begging proper argument when a sane person does not doubt the 
argument’s conclusion. Davies, so far presented, has remained silent about whether 
such a case is a case o f transmission failure. The second point can be put another 
way, provided a subject S does not doubt the conclusion o f a question begging 
proper argument, then as we saw above such an argument can be considered to be a 
problematically warranted argument. Hence Davies has established something 
roughly like the (PWA) premise. But Argument 2 requires other premises in 
addition to (PWA) in order to charge problematically warranted arguments as being
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transmission failures. I am going to suggest that it is Davies’ discussion of certain 
arguments failing to rule out alternatives to their conclusions which establishes the 
premises needed to supplement (PWA) in Argument 2.
What are Davies’ remarks on certain arguments failing to rule out alternatives to 
their conclusions? Davies focuses on cases of question begging proper arguments 
where we have a (rational or sane) subject, S, who does not doubt the conclusion the 
question-begging proper argument. Hence we are considering the following sort of 
case:
(a) We have an argument of the form [A, (if A, then B) therefore B].
(b) S has a typical warrant, w, for believing A..
(c) S knows that (if A, then B).
(d) S does not doubt that B.
(e) If  S doubted B, then S would not consider himself to have the warrant, w, 
for believing A.
The question is: does S acquire a warrant for believing B, by way of his warrant w for 
believing A and his knowledge that (if A, then B)? In order to investigate this 
question, lets say S has a prima facie warrant w+ for believing B by way of his 
warrant w for believing A and his knowledge that (if A, then B). The question is: is 
w+ a genuine warrant? Davies’ answer to this question is negative.
I think Davies is committed to the, second premise of Argument 2, the ruling out 
alternatives claimr.
(ROA)
A prima facie warrant w is a warrant for believing P is a genuine warrant only if w 
rules out some of the alternatives to P.
Consider Davies’ remarks on the matter below:
Davies is referring to the following argument (G) in the passage:
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(Gl) A goal has just been scored.
(G2) If a goal has just been scored, this is not a take in a movie scene.
Therefore,
(G3) This is not a take in a movie scene.
“Against the background assumption that a genuine Australian Rules football match 
is in progress, the evidence of ball, crowd and flags counts in favour of the 
hypothesis that a goal has been scored against a host o f other alternative hypotheses. 
For example, the evidence counts against the hypothesis that.. .the ball has been 
kicked out of bounds. In short, evidence rules out the various ways in which the 
hypothesis that a goal has been scored could have been false, and it is for this reason 
that the evidence provides a resource for resolving doubt. It is also by ruling out 
alternatives that evidence confers knowledge. This is how evidence constitutes epistemic warrant.
But the evidence of ball, crowds and flags does not count in favour of the hypothesis 
that a football match rather than a movie scene is in progress and against alternative 
hypotheses. The evidence, even taken together with considerations which support the 
conditional premiss, does nothing to rule out the most obviously salient alternative hypothesis, 
namely that it is a movie scene that I am watching. The evidence would be of no 
help in resolving my doubt and it does confer knowledge. My epistemic warrants for 
the premises do not add up to an epistemic warrant for the conclusion.” (2000, 
p399-400, my italics).
The first italicised part of the passage above indicates why I think Davies holds 
(ROA). The second italicised part o f the passage provides further evidence that 
Davies holds (ROA) since I take it to be saying that the evidence for (Gl) does not 
count against any alternative to (G3). It has recently been claimed that Davies is 
committed to something stronger than (ROA). The stronger claim that Davies is 
alleged to be committed to is:
Salient alternatives claim:
(SA)
A prima facie warrant w is a warrant for P is a genuine warrant for P only if w rules 
out relevant or salient alternatives to P.30
30 “Davies claims that warrant fails to transmit from the premises to the conclusion 
of the goal argument since warrant for the premises fails to rule out the salient 
alternatives to the conclusion.” (Brown, forthcoming p262)
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Now the third italicised part of the passage above may be thought to support the 
attribution of (SA) to Davies. However, given the first two italicised passages I 
simply take the third italicised passage to be pointing out since the evidence for (G3) 
does not rule out any alternative to (G3), then such evidence will not rule out the 
most salient alternative to (G3).
How does the above passage bear on whether the prima facie warrant w+ for B? 
Since one of the background assumptions that is required for the warrant, w, for A, 
to count as a warrant is the background assumption that B, then, according to 
Davies, S’s prima facie warrant w+ for believing B will do nothing to rule out any 
alternatives to B. Hence, w+ is not a genuine warrant That is to say Davies is 
committed to the third and final premise of Argument 2:
The failing to rule out alternatives claim
(FROA)
S’s prima facie warrant for believing B by way of his warrant, w, for believing A and 
his knowledge that (if A, then B) cannot rule out any alternatives to B.
For concreteness let’s consider what Davies would say about the (Z) argument where 
S has the typical visual warrant, w, for (Zl) that animal is a zebra, w is a genuine 
warrant for Davies since w rules out various alternatives to (Zl) (i.e. some or at least 
one alternative). For example, w rules out the alternatives that that animal is a 
mouse, is a dog, is a parrot, etc. However, w only does this against a background of 
certain assumptions and one of those assumptions is that (Z3) that animal is not a 
cleverly disguised mule is true. Hence w cannot rule out not-(Z3). Suppose we call 
the prima facie warrant for believing (Z3) obtained from S’s warrant w and 
knowledge that (Z2) if that animal is a zebra w l. The question is does w l rule out 
any alternative to (Z3)? The answer to this question, according to Davies, would be 
‘no’ since in order to obtain the warrant w l S has been assuming in some sense that 
the alternatives to (Z3) are false (or put another way S has been assuming, in some 
sense, (Z3) to be true). Therefore, since wl does not rule out any alternatives to
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(Z3), w l is not a genuine warrant. So here we have a case of S’s warrant, w, for 
believing (Zl) failing to transmit across the known entailment (Z2).
This exposition of Davies shows that he is roughly committed to Argument 2. 
Davies then codifies this argument in his limitation principle (L)
§3.2 Responses to Davies (2002)
There are a number of criticisms that can be raised against Davies. The first 
criticism is that Davies’ discussion of warrants ruling out alternatives has 
controversial consequences. The second criticism claims that question-begging 
proper arguments do not suggest such arguments are transmission failures. I’m 
going to argue that these first two criticisms do not have much force since they are 
either based on misattributing views to Davies or that they fail to recognise how 
Davies’ discussions o f begging the question proper and ruling out alternatives work 
together. A third criticism of my own concerns an ambiguity in the doubt clause of 
the limitation principle. As we have seen I think there is a problem taking both o f 
these arguments separately on my view they work together to explain why certain 
arguments fail to transmit across known entailments.
§3.2.a Response 1: Davies’ discussion of warrants ruling out alternatives has 
controversial consequences
This main proponent of this criticism is Brown (forthcoming)31. Brown argues that 
Davies* discussion of warrants ruling out alternatives has at least two undesirable 
consequences: (a) it rules out our having a warrant for believing propositions 
obtained from false premises and (b) it rules out our having a warrant for believing 
false propositions.32
What is Brown’s argument for the undesirable consequence (a)?
31 pp259-269
32 A third criticism is that Davies’ discussion of ruling out alternatives yields counter­
intuitive results on both internalist and externalist accounts of warrant. I don’t have 
space to discuss this here but this line of thought too may involve attributing (SA) to 
Davies.
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Brown asks us to consider the following argument:
(McE)
(McEl) I have just seen McEnroe win this year’s Wimbledon final.
(McE2) If I have just seen McEnroe win this year’s Wimbledon final, then McEnroe 
is this year’s Wimbledon champion.
Therefore,
(McE3) McEnroe is this year’s Wimbledon champion.
Brown then sets the details of this case up as follows. (McEl) is false since the 
subject considering the (MCE) argument, Julie, is watching a repeat of last year’s 
Wimbledon final where McEnroe beat Connors. The BBC is showing a repeat of 
last year’s final rather than showing this year’s final live due to technical details. It is 
uncontroversial that Julie knows (McE2). And (McE3) also happens to be true since 
McEnroe has in fact just beaten Connors in this year’s Wimbledon final and hence is 
this year’s Wimbledon Champion.
If  we allow that Julie has a warrant for believing (McEl) we would intuitively want to 
allow that this warrant transmits across Julie’s knowledge o f the entailment (McE2). 
However, if we attribute the salient alternatives claim (SA) to Davies, he cannot 
support this intuition:
(SA)
A prima facie warrant w is a warrant for P is a genuine warrant for P only if w rules 
out relevant or salient alternatives to P.
Davies cannot support our intuitions here when he is attributed (SA). Why not? Let 
w l be the prima facie warrant Julie obtains from her warrant for believing (McEl) 
and her knowledge that (McE2). Why can’t Davies hold wl is a genuine warrant if 
he holds (SA)? One relevant alternative to (McE3) is that McEnroe is not this year’s 
Wimbledon champion and the broadcast is a replay. Julie’s warrant, w, does not rule 
at least this relevant alternative out. Hence Julie’s warrant w l for believing (McE3)
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does not rule at least this relevant alternative out. Therefore, if (SA) is true, wl is not 
a genuine warrant for believing (McE3).
However, as I have argued earlier, there is not conclusive textual evidence to 
attribute (SA) to Davies. Indeed the text supports Davies subscribing to a much 
weaker ruling out alternatives claim:
(ROA)
A prima facie warrant n> is a warrant for believing P is a genuine warrant only if n> 
rules out some of the alternatives to P.
Given (ROA) Julie’s (defeasible) warrant for believing (McEl) does in fact rule out 
some alternatives to (McEl) such as the match has not been rained off and nobody 
has yet won, the match has not been postponed due to a bomb scare, Becker got to 
this year’s final and beat Connors to win. Sure, (McEl) is false and hence Julie 
cannot know (McEl) but Julie does have a warrant for believing (McEl), given 
(ROA). Does Julie’s prima facie warrant, w l, for believing (McE3) rule out some 
alternatives to (McE3)? The answer is ‘yes’ since wl is obtained partly by way of 
Julies warrant for believing (McEl), her warrant wl rules out the alternatives that no 
one is this year’s champion due to the match being postponed, or that Becker is this 
year’s champion. Hence, wl would be a genuine warrant for Davies on my reading 
of Davies which attributes (ROA) to Davies rather than (SA).
Brown’s second charge is that Davies discussion of warrant and ruling out 
alternatives leads to the counter intuitive consequence (b) that one cannot have a 
warrant for believing a false proposition. The charge proceeds as follows. (McEl) is 
false. A relevant alternative to (McEl) is that Julie has not seen this year’s final and 
the broadcast is a repeat. But Julie’s warrant for believing (McEl) cannot rule out 
this relevant alternative. Hence, if (SA) is attributed to Davies, Davies cannot say 
Julie has a warrant for believing (McEl).
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The basic response to Brown’s second charge from Davies is to make the same 
move as above. Deny that Davies is committed to (SA) and instead hold that Davies 
is committed to (ROA) which allows Davies to hold that false beliefs are warranted.
§3.2.b Response 2: question-begging proper arguments do not suggest such 
arguments are transmission failures
Beebee (2001) (Beebee has also been seconded by Brown (forthcoming)) has claimed 
that if an argument begs the question proper, then such an argument is not a case of 
transmission failure.
Beebee’s criticism is based on the contention that there are two ways in which an 
argument can fail to convince: either the argument is a failure of transmission of a 
certain warrant to transmit across our knowledge that the premises o f the argument 
entail the conclusion or a valid argument can fail to convince by being incapable of 
persuading someone who doubts the conclusion.
Beebee then claims that Davies has shown that the problematic arguments like (Z) 
and (M) fail to convince in the second sense of being incapable o f persuading 
someone who doubts their conclusion but this does not allow Davies to conclude 
that the arguments fail to convince in the sense that such arguments are transmission 
failures. Therefore, according to Beebee, the fact that problematic arguments like 
(Z) and (M) fail to convince in the second sense does not lend any plausibility to the 
claim that in some cases warrant is not transmitted from the premises of a valid 
argument when we know the argument’s premises entail the argument’s conclusion.
Beebee argues for this claim by noting that if a valid argument begs the question 
proper for a subject, then on Davies’ view, the subject will not take his alleged 
evidence for the one o f premises to be any evidence at all given his background 
beliefs. For example, a subject who doubts that that animal is a cleverly disguised 
mule will not take any perceptual experiences to be evidence for (Zl) that animal is a 
zebra and hence will not take himself to have warrant for believing (Zl) on the basis 
these perceptual experiences. But then in this case, goes Beebee’s response, we do 
not have a case o f transmission failure since one o f the necessary conditions for a
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transmission failure does not obtain — the necessary condition being that the subject 
have warrant for the major premise of the problematic arguments we have been 
considering. Hence, even if an argument begs the question proper, it is not a case of 
transmission failure according to Beebee. This is nicely put in the following 
quotation:
“We can diagnose an argument as question-begging in a way which simply does not 
touch on the question of warrant can be transferred from its premises to its 
conclusion. Just because an argument fails to convince sceptics, nothing at all 
follows about whether or not anyone who does regard the premises as warranted is 
entitled to transfer warrant to [its conclusion].” (2001, p359).
I think Beebee’s response crucially misses how Davies’ discussion of question- 
begging proper arguments and ruling out alternatives work together. Davies could 
make the following reply to Beebee’s argument. Davies can grant that when an 
argument begs the question proper anyone sane who doubts the conclusion will not 
take themselves to have warrant for believing all o f the premises of the argument and 
hence a necessary condition for the argument to be a case o f transmission failure for 
any sane person who doubts the conclusion of that argument. However, what Davies will 
say is that a question-begging proper argument for any sane person who does not doubt the 
conclusion of that argument is a transmission failure. Recall, that my reading of Davies’ 
argument above is, roughly, that question-begging-proper arguments where subjects 
who do not doubt the conclusion of that argument, fail to produce a genuine warrant 
for believing their conclusion, if we take a genuine warrant for a proposition to be a 
warrant which rules out some alternatives to that proposition.
One might think Beebee has anticipated this reply from Davies in the following 
passage:
“One might try to claim at this point that although there are indeed two senses in 
which an argument can fail to convince, arguments which fail to convince in a sense 
they beg the question just are arguments which fail to transmit warrant. In the 
absence of any reason to suppose that the two senses come apart, we can legitimately 
claim that they are co-extensive, and hence the failure o f an argument to convince 
sceptics can be used as indirect support for the limitation principle.
However, I think it can be shown that the two senses do come apart with the 
following argument (A):
A l. The Australian says the Crows won the Grand Final
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A2. If The Australian says the Crows won the Grand Final, then the Crows won the 
Grand Final
A3 [Therefore] The Crows won the Grand Final.
This, o f course, is a perfectly straightforward argument, which might easily and 
legitimately, convince a normal person that the Crows won the Grand Final. But if 
we try to run (A) in the face of die-hard sceptics, the sceptics will o f course doubt 
the conclusion, since if they doubt the existence o f the world they will likewise doubt 
the existence of Australian rules football teams. And (A) cannot convince the 
sceptics into believing (A3) because, as with any argument from perceptual premises, 
their reasons for doubting (A3) will lead them to deny the implicitly offered 
perceptual evidence for (Al) is evidence: they will deny that perceptual newspaper- 
headline experience gives one any reason whatever to suppose that either 
newspapers or the events they mention really exist. ” (p359).
The basic line of thought from Beebee is that certain arguments fail to convince 
sceptics about the external world, such as argument (A). But (A) is intuitively an 
argument which is not a transmission failure. Hence, if an argument fails to 
convince a sceptic about the external world who doubts its conclusion, then such an 
argument is not a transmission failure for non-doubters and many other kinds of 
doubters about the conclusion.
Again Davies could make the following reply to this challenge from Beebee. There 
is a distinction between an argument which begs the question proper and an 
argument which begs the question against the sceptic about the external world. The 
former sense of begging the question is when anyone sane who doubts the 
conclusion of the argument regards the prima facie evidence offered for the premises 
of the argument as no evidence relative to his doubt. The later case of begging the 
question is when a sceptic about the external world doubts the conclusion of the 
argument regards the prima facie evidence for the premises of the premises of the 
argument as no evidence relative to his doubt. Note that for some arguments the 
two sense of question begging are equivalent. For example consider the argument
(M):
(M)
(Ml) Here is a hand.
(M2) If  this is a hand, then the external world exists. 
Therefore,
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(M3) The external world exists.
Here when anyone sane or rational doubts (M3), they will effectively be sceptics about 
the external world provided they are able to recognise the consequences of doubting 
(M3); and hence they will regard the typical prima facie evidence for (Ml) as no 
evidence relative to their doubt. Similarly sceptic as about the external world will of 
course doubt (M3) and regard the typical prima facie evidence for (Ml) as no 
evidence relative to their doubt.
Now let’s consider argument (A) to which Beebee refers. Let’s grant Beebee has 
established that (A) begs the question for sceptics about the external world. Does 
(A) beg the question proper? Does anyone sane who doubts (A3) regard the typical 
prima facie perceptual evidence for (Al) as no evidence relative to their doubt? I 
think the answer is ‘no’. Sane people can doubt (A3) for a variety of reasons they may 
think the Crows are going through a bad spell at the moment and have no chance of 
winning the final, or they may think that the final was postponed because of bad 
weather and so on (let’s call such doubts mundane doubts about (A3J). It is true that 
some sane people will doubt (A3) because they are sceptics about the external world 
and we have already granted (A) begs the question against such sceptics. The 
question is does (A) beg the question against anyone who doubts the conclusion? 
The answer is negative. The typical prima facie perceptual evidence for (Al) does 
count as evidence for at least some mundane doubters about (A3). For example, 
suppose I think the final has been rained off due to bad weather (and hence doubt 
(A3)), then I pick up the Australian newspaper and read that the Crows have won 
the final; it seems that the evidence from the Australian newspaper does count as 
evidence relative to this sort of doubt. Hence, for some sane people who doubt (A3) 
the prima facie perceptual evidence for (Al) will be no evidence relative to their 
doubt. But for at least some sane doubters about (A3), that is, at least some 
mundane doubters about (A3). This is sufficient to establish that (A) does not beg 
the question proper.
More generally for any argument so long as there is one way in which a sane or 
rational person can doubt the conclusion can still regard the evidence offered for the 
premises as evidence the argument does not beg the question proper. Note in the
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case of a doubt about (M3) the external world exists it seemed that the only way to 
rationally doubt (M3) was to effectively e a sceptic about the external world.
§3.2.c Response 3: ways of doubting
I want to argue here that as it stands (L) is too strong and is open to counter­
examples. Before I give this argument, one might wonder why I am bothering to 
raise such a problem given Davies says:
“There can be no doubt that even this revised version of [(L)] will face counter­
examples and will require further modifications.” (p404).
I am raising the particular counter-example that follows for two reasons. First, the 
counter-example I shall raise will show that the limitation principle does not quite 
properly codify Davies’ argument that question-begging proper arguments are 
transmission failures (when considered by subjects who do not doubt the conclusion 
o f such arguments). Secondly, the counter-example I raise here, as we shall see in 
Chapter 3, may have a bearing on Davies’ verdict on the SK paradox..
Recall that Davies’ limitation principle (L) says: “Epistemic warrant cannot be 
transmitted from the premises of a valid argument to its conclusion, if, for one of the 
premises, the warrant for that premiss counts as a warrant only against the 
background of certain assumptions and acceptance of those assumptions cannot be 
rationally combined with doubt about the truth o f the conclusion.” (2000, p402).
Here’s the counter example. Consider the argument (F):
(F)
(FI) The animal in the garbage is a fox
(F2) If  the animal in the garbage is a fox, then it is not a car.
Therefore,
(F3) The animal in the garbage is not a cat.
(F) is intuitively an argument where a typical visual warrant, w, for (FI) transmits 
across the known entailment (F2).
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Suppose I have a typical visual warrant, w, for believing (FI). Hence, my warrant w 
is made against at least the background example that the animal in the garbage is not 
a cat cleverly disguised as a fox. But suppose that I doubt (F3) in one specific way: I 
believe that the animal in the garbage is a cat cleverly disguised as a fox. Can my 
specific doubt here be rationally combined with the background assumptions 
required for w to be a warrant for believing (FI)? If  I doubt that (F3) in this specific 
way then it would not be rational for me to make the background assumption that 
that the animal in the garbage is a cat cleverly disguised as a fox. Hence, according 
to Davies* limitation principle (L) the argument (F) is a failure of my warrant, w, for 
believing (FI) to transmit across the known entailment (F2).
This counter-example reveals that (L) codifies arguments which are not question- 
begging proper arguments as transmission failures. This is because (F) is not a 
question-begging proper argument as shown above. Recall, one requirement on 
non-question-begging proper arguments was that there is at least one way in which a 
sane or rational person who doubts the conclusion of the argument who regards the 
typical prima facie perceptual evidence for the premises as evidence relative to his 
doubt. (L), as it stands, captures arguments which meet such requirements and the 
intuition is that this is incorrect.
A tentative suggestion of how to modify the limitation principle is as follows:
(L-modified) Epistemic warrant cannot be transmitted from the premises of a valid 
argument to its conclusion, if, for one of the premises, the warrant for that premiss 
counts as a warrant only against the background of certain assumptions and 
acceptance of those assumptions cannot be rationally combined with any kind of 
doubt about the truth of the conclusion.
The italicised words indicate where this modified limitation principle differs from 
(L).
(L-modified) allows that the argument (F) where one has a typical perceptual warrant 
for believing the (FI) to transmit across the known entailment (F2) for the following 
reasons. While doubting (F3) on the grounds that the animal in the garbage is a cat
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cleverly disguised as a fox, it is not the only kind of doubt I can have about (F3). I 
may doubt (F3) on the basis of some inductive evidence that no animals other than 
cats hang around my garbage and cats are the only animals in the area. I could doubt 
(F3) as a result of a testimony from a trustworthy source and so on. It seems these 
latter ways of doubting are rationally combinable with my background assumption 
that the animal in the garbage is not a cat cleverly disguised as a fox.
§4 Summary
In this Chapter I have distinguished two rough arguments (Argument 1 and 
Argument 2) which can be used to support our intuitions that many typical 
perceptual warrants fail to transmit across known entailments. As a result of 
considering the responses that could be made to these arguments I revealed that the 
arguments were committed to the following general principles about warrant.
Warrant and rational doubt principle.
(WRD)
For any prima facie warrant w for a proposition P: if n> is a genuine warrant for 
believing (or to believe) P, then w is able to resolve the doubt of a rational subject 
about P.
And the following premise from Argument 2. The jailing to rule out alternatives claim 
(FROA)
For any warrant prima facie warrant w for a proposition P: if w is a genuine warrant 
for believing (or to believe) P, then w is able to rule out some alternatives to P.
If  we deny these principles then we can allow that our typical perceptual warrants for 
the major premise of problematically warranted arguments fail to transmit across 
known entailments. But we have to concede that such a warrant is very limited in 
strength and we won’t get any stronger warrants for the conclusion of
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problematically warranted arguments as a result o f our typical perceptual warrant for 
the argument’s major premise and conclusion. That is to say, we allow there is weak 
warrant transmission in the case of problematically warranted arguments:
Weak warrant transmission principle:
For any subject S and any proposition P and any proposition Q: if S has a warrant, w, 
for believing P and S knows P entails Q, then S has a weak warrant for believing Q 
by way of his warrant w for believing P and knowledge that P entails Q.
Where a weak warrant is a warrant for believing a proposition tj; is a warrant which 
does not resolve rational doubt about <|> and does not rule out any alternatives to
We deny that there is strong transmission:
Strong warrant transmission principle:
For any subject S and any proposition P and any proposition Q: if S has a warrant, w, 
for believing P and S knows P entails Q, then S has a strong warrant for believing Q 
by way of his warrant w for believing P and knowledge that P entails Q.
Where a strong warrant is a warrant for believing a proposition ^ is a warrant which 
resolves rational doubt about ^ or rules out some alternatives to t|*.
Secondly, I’ve argued that that the two arguments I’ve distinguished( Argument 1 
and Argument 2) are good approximations of Wright and Davies’ templates as to 
why certain arguments are transmission failures. I also observed that Argument 2 
was the stronger argument in the sense that it remained neutral over the theory of 
warrant required to support its conclusion. Hence, this makes Davies’ template for 
transmission failure of certain perceptual warrants a much stronger template than 
Wright’s, in the sense that one cannot reject it by subscribing to an alternative 
account of warrant.
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Thirdly, I briefly reviewed the charge that Wright’s template for transmission failure 
is far too strong and suggested a new template amended by Brown on Wright’s 
behalf is on the right track but still needs to exclude some further problem cases. I 
also argued that Davies has the resources to reply to at least two of the current 
criticisms to his template for transmission failure (the responses from Brown 
(forthcoming) and Beebee). But I then suggested a different problem for Davies’ 
template and tentatively suggested an amendment to resolve this problem.
I shall now apply the results in this chapter when I consider the transmission failure 
compatibilist’s second step in resolving the SK paradox in Chapter 3.
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Chapter 3
Introduction
Recall that the overall transmission compatibilist strategy is:
Step 1 *: A certain epistemic structure is present in the cases where we intuitively 
think a certain kind of perceptual warrant fails to transmit across a known 
entailment.
Step 2’: The epistemic structure identified in Step 1’ is present in the case where we 
have non-empirical knowledge that (Wl) (I am thinking water is wet) and a priori 
knowledge that (W2) (if I am thinking that water is wet, then I am in a water-world).
Step 2’ allows the transmission failure compatibilist to conclude S’s non-empirical 
warrant that (Wl) fails to transmit across S’s a priori knowledge that (W2). Hence, 
according to the compatibilist, S cannot gain a non-empirical knowledge sufficient 
warrant for the consequent of (W2) (which is (W3)). Therefore, according to the 
compatibilist, S does not know (W3) non-empirically resolving the SK paradox.
In this chapter I want to review both step 2* of the compatibilist solution in light o f 
the results established in Chapter 2.
First, in §1,1 look at ways in which the compatibilist can be simply granted step 2’ 
and examine the various replies one could make to stop the compatibilist using step 
2* to establish that non-empirical warrant for (Wl) fails to transmit across the a priori 
known entailment (Z2). I shall argue that these replies indicate a different way we 
can allow that we have both non-empirical warrant that (Wl) and a priori knowledge 
that (W2).
Secondly, in §2,1 examine step 2’ itself given the possibility of so called ‘illusions o f 
content*. I examine whether step 2* is correct given that I upheld the result that the 
Wright template was far too strong in the last chapter. Here I conclude that the 
transmission failure compatibilist solution as stated in Chapter 1 fails but this failure
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shows why bullet-biting compatibilism succeeds. I shall argue that this result 
concurs with Wright’s own change of view in his papers in 2000 and 2001.
Thirdly, §3, in I continue with my examination o f step 2’ and note examine Davies’ 
argument for the conclusion that the (W) is a transmission failure. I attribute this 
conflicting result to the fact that Davies, unlike Wright, does not allow for the 
possibility of an illusion of content.
§1 Unproblematic non-empirical knowledge that Pm in a water- 
world
One of the main conclusions from Chapter 2 was that we could deny that arguments 
like (Z) where I have a typical perceptual warrant for believing (Zl) were failures of 
transmission provided if we denied certain principles about warrant. More generally 
Chapter 2 showed my problematically warranted argument <J> where w is a warrant 
for believing O ’s major premise is a failure of w to transmit across O ’s minor 
premise if we denied the certain principles about warrant These principles of 
warrant were:
Warrant and rational doubtprinciple:
(WRD)
For any prima facie warrant tv for a proposition P: if tv is a genuine warrant for 
believing (or to believe) P, then tv is able to resolve the doubt of a rational subject 
about P.
And the following premise from Argument 2. The ruling out alternatives claim 
(ROA)
For any warrant prima facie warrant n> for a proposition P: if tv is a genuine warrant 
for believing (or to believe) P, then tv is able to rule out some alternatives to P.
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Denying these principles allowed us to say that the relevant instance of principle 
below is true:
Weak warrant transmission principle:.
For any subject S and any proposition P and any proposition Q: if S has a warrant, w, 
for believing P and S knows P entails Q, then S has a weak warrant for believing Q 
by way o f his warrant w for believing P and knowledge that P entails Q.
Where a weak warrant is a warrant for believing a proposition is a warrant which 
does not resolve rational doubt about and does not rule out any alternatives to ij>.
I am going to grant for the sake of argument that the compatibilist has established 
step 2 \ That is to say I’m going to grant that the transmission failure compatibilist 
has established that our non-empirical warrant for believing (Wl) and a priori 
knowledge that (W2) exhibit the same sort of epistemic structure as the cases where 
perceptual warrant fails to transmit. On either of my rough arguments in Chapter 2 
this means granting the transmission-failure compatibilist that the (W) argument 
where S has a non-empirical warrant for (Wl) and a priori knowledge that (W2) is a 
problematically warranted argument. More specifically, S has a non empirical 
warrant, w, for believing (Wl), S knows a priori that (W2) and not-(W3) (it is not the 
case that I’m in a water world) is an undercutting defeater for S’s warrant w. Let’s 
note immediately that, on this analysis, S cannot doubt that he is in a water-world or 
believe that he is not in a water-world since this would defeat S’s warrant, w, for 
believing (Wl).
So what does it amount to say that S can have a weak warrant for (W3) by way of his 
non-empirical warrant, w, for believing (Wl) and his a priori knowledge that (W2)?
It would mean that S has a non-empirical warrant for believing (W3) which cannot 
rule out any alternatives to (Z3) and cannot persuade a rational doubter that (W3). 
Hence if (W3) is in fact true, and S has this non-empirical warrant for believing (W3), 
then S knows (W3) non-empirically (given the warrants for believing have been 
defined as knowledge-sufficient warrants).
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Is this result that S knows non-empirically that (W3) a win for the proponent o f the 
SK paradox over the transmission failure compatibilist? This result obviously 
conflicts with the result the transmission failure compatibilist wants to establish. 
However, it does not look like this is a win for the proponent of the SK paradox. 
This is because the non-empirical knowledge that (W3) which S possesses is 
harmless. It is harmless in the sense that it cannot persuade a rational doubter that S 
is in a water world and it cannot rule out any alternatives to S being in a water-world. 
This allows us to explain away the intuition that premise (4) of the SK paradox is 
true:
(4) S does not know that (W3) non-empirically.
S cannot be moved to use run through the (W) argument in his head in order to 
resolve a doubt about (W)’s conclusion or rule out any alternatives to (W)’s 
conclusion. So it looks like this is a win for the bullet-biting compatibilist. O f course 
this result is conditional on the principles about warrant (WRD) and (FROA) both 
being false and if these principles were true there would be no such thing as a weak 
non-empirical warrant for (W3).
§2 Extemalism which allows for content-illusion
In 2000 Wright argued that when S has a non-empirical warrant, w, for believing 
(Wl) and S knows a priori that (W2)
There was an proposition C which fitted his A-B-C template below:
An argument o f the form [A, (A, then B), therefore B] fails to be a case where a 
certain warrant [w] for A transmits across the known entailment if A, then B when 
there is some proposition C such that:
(v) A entails B
(vi) My warrant [w] for A consists in my being in a state which is subjectively
indistinguishable from a state in which the relevant C would be true
(vii) C is incompatible with A
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(viii) C would be true, if B were false
For C = “the seeming thought which I attempt to token by “I believe water is wet” 
is content-defective owing the reference failure of the purported natural kind term 
“water” in my language.” (Wright 2000, p i 56).
C is a proposition which captures the possibility o f an illusion of content where both my 
encounters and my speech communities encounters with water are taken to be 
illusory. I don’t have the space to discuss whether such an illusion o f content is a 
genuine possibility given the relevant instance of extemalism. But I will in this 
section look at the results for the SK paradox if it is a genuine possibility.
According to Wright, we then make an a priori presumption or have an a priori 
entidement or have an a priori warrant to believe that not-C which is independent of 
our non-empirical warrant for (Wl).
Wright in 2000 claimed each of the four conditions o f the A-B-C template are met 
for the (W) argument.
Condition (i) is obviously met given we are taking (W2) to be true.
Condition (ii) is met since “My warrant for (Wl) consists in my being in a state 
which is subjectively indistinguishable from a state in which the relevant proposition 
C, that the seeming-thought which I attempt to express by “I believe water is wet” is 
content defective owing the reference failure of the purported natural kind term 
“water” in my language, would be true.
Condition (iii) s obviously satisfied C is incompatible with (Wl).
According to Wright (in 2000) condition (iv) is satisfied C would be true if B (W3) 
were false. But since the Wright has changed his view:
“But there is a misgiving about it which needs to be confronted. It concerns the 
fourth condition o f the disjunctive template—specifically the claim that when strong
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extemalism is assumed, freedom by me and my speech community from all historical 
contact with water would suffice to induce content-defectiveness into our purported 
water thoughts. That is unquestionably so when the alternative scenarios considered 
are of the Dry Earth type. But what justifies us— theorists—in restricting attention 
to those? If  Twin-Earth scenarios are considered as well, then our purported water 
thoughts would suffer not divestment of content but change of content. Had our 
actual encounters been with twater, not water, the relevant B would have been false. 
But the relevant C would not have been true: my term, 'water', would not have been 
divested of content but would have expressed the concept, twater, instead. So the 
template, it seems, does not cleanly fit the case.” (2001, pi 3).
As we saw in Chapter 2 Wright’s template has recently been criticised. In Chapter 2 
I took the most plausible amendment to be Brown’s changing of condition (ii) but 
had some misgivings about whether this change was exactly correct. But the main 
point here is that even on revised versions o f the template condition (iv) remains 
unchanged. So it looks like on Wright’s template non-empirical warrant for believing 
(Wl) will transmit across the a priori known entailment (W2). Hence, S will have a 
non-empirical warrant that he is in a water-world and hence know non-empirically 
that he is in a water world. Is this conclusion problematic? Judging from the quote 
above from Wright it seems not — all non-empirical knowledge that I am in a water 
world amounts to is that I know non-empirically my thought expresses some kind of 
content — rather than no content at all.
This point is put well by Noordhof:
“In another sense, though, my a priori knowledge is not based on a capacity to 
identify something highly specific about the world at all... [Given extemalism] 
subjects cannot only distinguish between their[water thought which has as its 
extension H20] and [their water thought that has as its extension XYZ], they also 
cannot distinguish their thought that water [which has as its extension H20] is wet 
from the thought that water is wet where Vater* picks out electrical stimulations 
brought about in a brain in a vat, or the machinations o f a malicious demon, or a 
whole range of other phenomenally similar but microstructurally different substances 
in different possible worlds. By the same token subject’s a priori knowledge that 
they are in a [water-world] is compatible with their ability to distinguish between all 
the scenarios just described” (2004, p55).
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Hence, when if have the intuition that we cannot know non-empirically that we are 
in a water-world. Then we may have in mind that the empirical proposition we 
know is very specifically identifying an environmental condition. But when we 
realise such knowledge is indistinguishable from changes of content and illusions of 
content, then us having non-empirical knowledge of a very general empirical 
proposition is not intuitively intolerable.
It would be interesting to see how things work out on Davies* limitation principle, if 
we allow for illusions of content (Note that this is not Davies’ position, since as we 
shall see below Davies does not allow for illusions o f content.)
Recall in Chapter 2 I modified Davies template as follows:
(L-modified) Epistemic warrant cannot be transmitted from the premises o f a valid 
argument to its conclusion, if, for one of the premises, the warrant for that premiss 
counts as a warrant only against the background of certain assumptions and 
acceptance of those assumptions cannot be rationally combined with any kind of 
doubt about the truth of the conclusion.
The question is: if I doubt I am in a water-world, then can I rationally combine my 
doubt with the background assumptions required for me to have a non-empirical 
warrant for me to think that water is wet? This will depend on your view about what 
the background assumptions for self-knowledge are. Suppose one of those 
background assumptions is I’m not having an illusion of content about water. Is 
such a background assumption rationally combinable with some kind o f doubt I’m 
not in a water world? I think the answer is ‘yes’ suppose I don’t doubt I ’m having a 
content illusion but I have a mundane doubt about whether my thoughts have some 
kind of content. Then is seems here, I can rationally combine this doubt with my 
non-empirical warrant that I am thinking that water is wet. This result is enough to 
secure the result that there is no failure of transmission of warrant in the SK 
paradox. But it does not mean to say the proponent of the SK paradox wins. Our 
investigation as to why the transmission failure compatibilist solution fails ends up 
revealing why the bullet biting compatibilist strategy seems correct. Again however, 
this result is conditional, on the SK paradox allowing for illusions o f content.
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§3 Davies: An epistemic principle which denies the possibility of 
content illusion
In this section I want to review Davies (2000) *s actual strategy for dissolving the SK 
paradox.
Davies* first move to resolving the SK paradox is to claim that the following 
condition, (P), is necessary for any subject S to have any warrant for a proposition:
(P) “ [a] putative warrant for A counts as a warrant only against the background of 
the assumption that there is such a proposition as the proposition A.” (p410).
Davies* reasons for this claim are:
“For any proposition, A, if there were no such proposition as A, if there were no 
such thing to think, to entertain, to believe, to doubt or to confirm as the 
proposition A, then there could be no question of anything justifying my believing 
A.** (p410).
Note that (P) denies us the possibility of an illusion of content This is because an 
illusion o f content would allow that one can have a warrant for believing one*s 
‘seeming thoughts that water is wet*. (P) denies this possibility: in order to have a 
warrant for £I am thinking water is wet’, then *1 am thinking that water is wet’ must 
be a proposition. By the externalist thesis (W2) if I am thinking that water is wet, 
then I am in a water-world. Hence (P) has the consequence that in order to have a 
warrant for ‘I am thinking water is wet*, then it must be true that I am in a water- 
world.
Davies’ next step in resolving the paradox is to transpose his limitation principle (L) 
in Chapter 2 into a slightly different limitation principle which I shall label (L*).
(L*) “Epistemic warrant cannot be transmitted from the premises of a valid argument 
to its conclusion if, for one of the premises, acceptance (i) o f the assumption that 
there is such a proposition for the knower to think as that premiss and (ii) o f the 
warrants for the other premises cannot be rationally combined with doubt about the 
truth o f the conclusion.” (p412).
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What is the difference between (L9) and Davies* limitation principle in Chapter 2 (L). 
Recall that (L) is:
(L): “Epistemic warrant cannot be transmitted from the premises of a valid argument 
to its conclusion, if, for one of the premises, the warrant for that premiss counts as a 
warrant only against the background of certain assumptions and acceptance of those 
assumptions cannot be rationally combined with doubt about the truth o f the 
conclusion.” (p402).
One difference is that (L9) does not speak about background assumptions in general 
but individuates the one particular background assumption namely the background 
assumption (P) there must be such a proposition as for the knower to think of as 
that premise, if the knower is to have a warrant for that premise. The second 
difference is that (L9) is meant to apply to arguments with more than two premises.
(L9) is quite clearly met in the case of the (W) argument if I doubt that I9m in a water- 
world but my having a non-empirical warrant for (Wl) and extemalism has the 
consequence that I am in a water-world, then the two would not be rationally 
combinable. This is because if doubt a consequence o f (Wl) and grant extemalism, 
then if I am rational that would lead me to doubt (Wl). Now if I doubted (Wl) the 
rational thing for me to do would be for me not to take my non-empirical warrant 
for (Wl) as a warrant. This is because there would be no such thing for me to think 
as water is wet and I couldn9t have a warrant for some sort o f content-illusion token 
of ‘I’m thinking water is wet9 because the possibility of content illusion has been 
denied.
In so far under the assumption that possibility of content illusion is denied I think 
this is the correct response. Moreover, once this view is combined with the result in 
Chapter 2 that many o f the criticisms of Davies limitation principles have failed it 
lands the proponent o f the SK paradox in the following position. It establishes that 
it is not the case that S knows non-empirically that (W3) by way of his non-empirical 
knowledge that (Wl) and a priori knowledge that (W2). The natural move for the 
proponent of the SK-paradox would then be to criticise Davies9 arguments for his 
limitation principles but as saw in Chapter 2 at least some of these criticisms fail. 
Once again this is a conditional conclusion, it depends on whether the principle (P) 
is true:
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(P) “ [a] putative warrant for A counts as a warrant only against the background of 
the assumption that there is such a proposition as the proposition A.” (p410).
I won’t try to settle the truth of (P) here. I will only note that if the proponent o f the 
SK paradox denies (P) then he allows for the possibility o f an illusion of content.
But if the proponent of the SK paradox allows for an illusion of content, then as we 
saw in §2 this gave the bullet biting compatibilist good reason to explain why non- 
empirical knowledge that I’m in a water-world is not absurd.
§4 Summary
In this chapter I have shown that a number of flaws in the transmission failure 
compatibilist response to the SK paradox have revealed why S’s non-empirical 
knowledge that (W3) (I am in a water world) is not absurd. On one view, provided 
the principles about warrant (WRD) and (ROA) are denied, such knowledge is not 
absurd because it is harmless knowledge in that it cannot be used to convince a 
rational doubter about (W3) or used to rule out alternatives to (W3). If  we allow for 
illusions o f contents in our thoughts, then non-empirical knowledge that I’m in a 
water-world is not absurd because it only allows S to know that his thought has some 
kind of content but this knowledge does not allow S to distinguish between being in 
a water-world and having a content illusion. Hence, on these views, subject to 
certain assumptions, even though transmission failure compatibilism is wrong, the 
SK paradox is also wrong to claim (4) S does not have non-empirical knowledge that 
(W3) (I am in a water world).
I have also shown that if we allow for the principle about warrant (P), then Davies’ 
compatibilist solution seems to be sound. Moreover, if the proponent of the SK 
paradox were to then try and refute some part of Davies* argument for these 
limitation principles, then this may be a difficult thing for him to do, given Davies 
has been adequately defended against some criticisms in Chapter 2. And also if the 
proponent o f the SK paradox denies (P) as a response to Davies, he just invites the 
bullet-biting compatibilist’s response that this shows why non-empirical knowledge 
that I’m in a water-world is unspecific and harmless.
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C onclusion
In Chapter 1 I defended the view that the most plausible SK paradox is as follows:
The paradox is that it is possible for any subject S to think through the (W) argument 
resulting in:
(1) S knows non-empirically that (Wl) I am thinking that water is wet.
(2) (W2) If  I am thinking that water is wet, then Pm in a water-world: (i.e. if 
(Wl), then (W3)).
(2a) S knows a priori that (W2)
’ Therefore,
(3) S knows non-empirically that (W3) I’m in a water-world.
(3) then conjoins with (4) below:
(4) It is not the case S knows non-empirically that (W3) Pm in a water-world.
In order to derive the absurd conclusion (5):
(5) S knows non-empirically that (W3) and it is not the case that S knows non- 
empirically that (W3).
I identified the principle which derives (3) from (1) and (2a) as being the Warrant 
Transmission Principle:
For any subject S and any proposition P and any proposition Q: if S has a warrant, iv, 
for believing P and S knows P entails Q, then S has a warrant for believing Q by way 
of his warrant w for believing P and knowledge that P entails Q.
And showed that the compatibilist needs to deny the relevant instance o f the 
principle for the (W) argument. I identified the compatibilists strategy for doing this 
as making two broad steps:
Step 1 *: A certain epistemic structure is present in the cases where we intuitively 
think a certain kind of perceptual warrant fails to transmit across a known 
entailment.
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Step 2’: The epistemic structure identified in Step T is present in the case where we 
have non-empirical knowledge that (Wl) (I am thinking water is wet) and a priori 
knowledge that (W2) (if I am thinking that water is wet, then I am in a water-world).
Step 2’ allows the transmission failure compatibilist to conclude S’s non-empirical 
warrant that (Wl) fails to transmit across S’s a priori knowledge that (W2). Hence, 
according to the compatibilist, S cannot gain a non-empirical knowledge sufficient 
warrant for the consequent of (W2) (which is (W3)). Therefore, according to the 
compatibilist, S does not know (W3) non-empirically resolving the SK paradox.
In examining the compatibilist’s Step T. I identified two arguments (Argument 1 
and Argument 2) that the warrant transmission principle fails for certain cases of 
perceptual warrant. I argued that Wright can be approximated as holding Argument 
1 and Davies could be approximated as holding Argument 2. I noted that Davies’ 
argument could be seen as the much stronger argument in the sense that it remained 
neutral over what account of warrant is correct and replied on Davies’ behalf to a 
number of criticisms. In discussing Arguments 1 and 2 that one could respond to 
either of the arguments and allow the transmission principle true for every kind of 
perceptual knowledge by denying the following principles about warrant:
Warrant and rational doubtprinciple:
(WRD)
For any prima facie warrant n> for a proposition P: if n> is a genuine warrant for 
believing (or to believe) P, then iv is able to resolve the doubt of a rational subject 
about P.
The ruling out alternatives clainr.
(ROA)
For any warrant prima facie warrant w for a proposition P: if iv is a genuine warrant 
for believing (or to believe) P, then iv is able to rule out some alternatives to P.
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I then applied the these results to the SK paradox above and concluded that:
First, if the principles (ROA) and (WRD) is denied and the (W) argument has the 
correct epistemic structure for transmission failure, then the compatibilist cannot 
reach his desired conclusion since we do gain very limited non-empirical knowledge 
by way of the (W) argument. But such knowledge is not absurd because it is 
harmless knowledge in that it cannot be used to convince a rational doubter about 
(W3) or used to rule out alternatives to (W3).
Secondly, provided we allow for illusions of content, then the compatibilist strategy 
fails on both Wright and Davies’ own templates for transmission failure. But again 
knowledge that I’m in a water-world is not absurd in this case because it only allows 
S to know that his thought has some kind of content rather than no content at all. 
Hence, on these views, even though transmission failure compatibilism is wrong, the 
bullet biting compatibilist is correct.
Thirdly when the epistemic principle (P) is affirmed:
(P) A putative warrant for A counts as a warrant only against the background o f the 
assumption that there is such a proposition as the proposition A
Then the possibility of an illusion of content is denied, and Davies’ limitation 
principle does in fact stop (3) being derived from (1) and (2) in the SK paradox.
It is worth thinking about these results from the perspective of the proponent o f the 
SK paradox. In order to stop the bullet-biting compatibilist response he needs to 
affirm the epistemic principles (WRD) and (ROA) but he also needs to deny the (P) 
principle to block the transmission failure compatibilist response from Davies. But 
also the second result has it that content-illusion needs to be denied to stop the 
bullet-biting compatibilist response. Therefore the proponent of the SK paradox has 
to find a way of denying the possibility of a content illusion and deny (P) given he is 
affirming (WRD) and (ROA).
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